European Union–China relations entered what Brussels officials describe as a “do no harm” phase, reflecting an uneasy and fragile détente shaped not by mutual trust, but by geopolitical disruption — chiefly from shifts in US leadership and global economic competition.
This new equilibrium, if it can be called that, is less a confident policy pivot than a cautious pause — somewhere between confrontation and cooperation — driven by growing fractures over trade imbalances, industrial dependencies, and transatlantic pressure. Brussels’ strategy now emphasizes restraint, avoiding escalation, and preventing further rupture with Beijing while defending its own economic interests.
From Confrontation to Cautious Truce
Relations between the EU and China have flared and faded over recent years, shaped by multiple flashpoints: trade disputes, industrial policy clashes, and competition over high-tech supply chains. A key moment was Beijing’s restriction on rare earth exports, critical components for advanced technologies, which sent shockwaves through European industry.
China controls the lion’s share of global production and processing capacity for these materials, and European factories were pushed into delayed orders and reduced operations, triggering a European outcry. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen labeled China’s actions a “pattern of dominance, dependency, and blackmail” — a stark condemnation that stirred political tensions in Brussels.
Despite this, and Europe’s own anti-coercion mechanisms ready for use, the EU shied away from retaliatory measures. When former US President Donald Trump negotiated directly with China to ease the rare-earth curbs, it shifted the geopolitical frame — benefiting global markets, including exporters in Europe, without Brussels’ direct intervention.
Geopolitical Crosswinds: The “Trump Shadow”
Europe’s strategy is shaped as much by concerns over Washington’s actions as by Beijing’s. In a world defined by shifting alliances and unpredictable diplomacy, the EU now feels pulled in competing directions:
-
Pressure from Washington, which has oscillated between tariff threats and strategic competition.
-
Economic incentives with China, from trade to investment prospects and supply chain concerns.
-
Internal divisions within the EU, where member states adopt diverse bilateral approaches.
Think tanks and analysts point to Trump’s aggressive trade posture as a catalyst for European strategic introspection. Rather than pushing Europe into a hard line against China, the result has partly been strategic hesitation — a reluctance to choose between Washington’s warnings and Beijing’s economic allure.
Fragmentation Within the Union
A notable challenge for EU foreign policy is the lack of a unified approach among member states. Instead of coherent bloc-wide strategies, individual capitals have pursued their own China policies. This bilateral iteration — with leaders visiting Beijing and prioritizing trade prospects — has diluted Brussels’ leverage and clouded long-term strategic planning.
This divergence stems from deep structural issues:
-
Trade imbalances: China’s massive trade surplus remains a source of economic concern for European policymakers. Brussels wants greater reciprocity and fair market access.
-
Economic coercion fears: European leaders worry that China’s use of export controls and industrial policy tools could be weaponized against key sectors.
-
Bilateral vs multilateral diplomacy: States like France, Germany, and Italy often pursue individual partnerships, sometimes overshadowing collective EU diplomacy.
The result is a paralyzed policy posture, in which ambition to engage China commercially contrasts sharply with a deeper concern about economic dependence and geopolitical risk.
Strategic Autonomy and Economic Security
At the heart of Brussels’ calculus is the concept of “strategic autonomy” — the idea that the EU must safeguard its interests without being overly reliant on external powers, whether Washington or Beijing. This priority is rooted partly in the EU’s broader foreign policy objectives, which define China as a partner in some areas, competitor in others, and systemic rival where values or security are concerned.
However, critics argue that such frameworks — while rhetorically compelling — have not translated into coherent, long-term strategies. Research from policy institutes highlights that Europe’s approach has been reactive rather than proactive, lacking a comprehensive blueprint to navigate complex China ties.
Balancing Act Amid Global Multipolarity
The EU’s “do no harm” stance is not a sign of weakness but rather of a deliberate balancing act. In an increasingly multipolar world, European policymakers face competing imperatives:
-
Preserving open markets and trade flows with China.
-
Protecting industrial and technological sectors from overdependence.
-
Maintaining strong strategic ties with the United States and NATO partners.
Brussels has refused to fully embrace a decoupling model, recognizing that economic integration with China — even if imperfect — underpins jobs, investment, and innovation across the bloc. Instead, Europe seeks to “de-risk” without decoupling — mitigating vulnerabilities while preserving economic engagement.
What Comes Next
Looking forward, analysts predict that EU–China relations will remain uneasy yet indispensable:
-
Trade and investment dialogues will continue, but with tougher scrutiny on market access and industrial subsidies.
-
Supply chain diversification will become a priority for strategic industries.
-
Diplomatic engagements may expand, but with Europe seeking firmer multilateral backing.
Europe’s strategic puzzle lies in forging a path that maximizes economic opportunity without compromising security or sovereignty. Whether the “do no harm” period becomes a stable new equilibrium or a prelude to more decisive assertiveness depends on shifts in global pressure points — including US policy, Chinese economic behavior, and EU internal cohesion.
EU–China relations in 2026 are defined by calculated restraint and geopolitical caution. The “do no harm” approach reflects a nuanced strategy shaped by economic interdependence, geopolitical competition, and a complex transatlantic landscape — not by ideological allyship or strategic certainty.
