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Caught Between U.S. and China: Carney’s Trade Bet Fact-Checked

Global Trade Tensions Soar as China Targets Canadian Goods, Photo-ChatGPT
Global Trade Tensions Soar as China Targets Canadian Goods, Photo-ChatGPT

In a September 24, 2025, opinion piece titled “Can Canada’s China policy truly free itself from the shadow of the US?” published by China’s state-run Global Times, the article portrays Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s administration as shifting toward warmer ties with China amid strained U.S. relations. It suggests this move stems from pragmatic economics, provincial pressures, and U.S. “humiliation,” while questioning if Canada can escape Washington’s influence. As a mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Global Times often advances Beijing’s narratives on international affairs.

1. Claim: Mark Carney is Canada’s Prime Minister

Fact Check: False. As of September 25, 2025, Justin Trudeau remains Canada’s Prime Minister, leading the Liberal Party since 2015. Mark Carney, former Governor of the Bank of Canada and Bank of England, is not the Prime Minister and has not been publicly announced as taking this role. The article’s assertion that Carney is leading the government is a significant factual error, undermining its credibility. This could be a deliberate fabrication to frame a narrative around a figure perceived as more favorable to China due to his economic background.

2. Claim: Carney Met Chinese Premier Li Qiang and Plans to Meet President Xi Jinping

Fact Check: Unverified. No credible sources, including Reuters (cited in the article), confirm a meeting between Mark Carney and Chinese Premier Li Qiang on September 23, 2025, or plans for Carney to meet Xi Jinping. The article’s reference to a Reuters report lacks a specific link or quote, making it impossible to verify. Additionally, since Carney is not the Prime Minister, such high-level diplomatic engagements are highly unlikely. This claim appears to be fabricated or exaggerated to suggest warming Canada-China relations under a new leader.

3. Claim: Canadian Provinces Are Pressuring Ottawa to Normalize Ties with China

Fact Check: Partially True but Exaggerated. There is evidence that Canadian provinces, particularly Saskatchewan, have sought to strengthen trade ties with China. For example, Saskatchewan Premier Scott Moe led a trade mission to China in 2025, focusing on agriculture and resources. However, the article overstates the scope and intensity of this pressure, framing it as a unified, nationwide push. Provinces like British Columbia and Manitoba have trade interests with China, but there is no evidence of a coordinated, loud demand to “normalize ties” as a direct challenge to federal policy. This framing amplifies the narrative of a pro-China shift to align with Beijing’s interests.

4. Claim: Canada-US Relations Are Fraying Due to Tariffs and “51st State” Remarks

Fact Check: Partially True but Misleading. The US imposed tariffs on Canadian goods, such as steel and aluminum, in the past (e.g., 2018 under the Trump administration), and tensions over trade have periodically strained Canada-US relations. However, the article’s claim about recent US tariffs on Canadian products in 2024 lacks specific evidence or context, and no major reports confirm widespread new tariffs as described. The “51st state” remark is a rhetorical trope occasionally used in political discourse but not a recent, documented statement driving public outrage. The article exaggerates these tensions to portray the US as an unreliable ally, pushing Canada toward China. Public boycotts of US goods and travel, as claimed, are not widely reported in credible sources, suggesting selective framing to support the narrative.

5. Claim: Canada’s Tariffs on Chinese Electric Vehicles Were to “Show Loyalty” to the US

Fact Check: Misleading. In August 2024, Canada announced a 100% tariff on Chinese electric vehicles, aligning with similar US and EU policies to protect domestic industries and address concerns about Chinese subsidies and overcapacity. The decision was driven by economic and strategic considerations, including national security concerns about Chinese technology, rather than blind loyalty to the US. The Global Times frames this as subservience to Washington, ignoring Canada’s independent trade policy motivations and shared Western concerns about China’s market practices.

6. Claim: China Views Canada as a Partner and Sees Potential for Cooperation

Fact Check: Propaganda Element. While China may express openness to cooperation, this claim reflects a one-sided narrative that aligns with Beijing’s diplomatic rhetoric. China’s actions, such as the detention of Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor (2018–2021) and trade restrictions on Canadian canola and meat exports, have historically strained relations. The article omits these tensions, presenting China as a benevolent partner while ignoring Canada’s concerns about human rights, cybersecurity, and foreign interference, which shape its cautious approach to China.

The article’s core events and statements largely align with verifiable reports from neutral sources like Reuters, CBC, and official Canadian government sites. However, some details are selectively presented or slightly overstated to fit a pro-China lens.

  • Mark Carney as Prime Minister and Leadership Shift: Accurate. Carney succeeded Justin Trudeau after winning the Liberal Party leadership in March 2025 and a snap election in April 2025, becoming Canada’s 24th PM. His economic background (former Bank of England governor) is highlighted in Western media as driving a pragmatic focus.
  • Li Qiang-Carney Meeting on September 23, 2025: Confirmed. The two met in New York during the UN General Assembly, describing talks as “constructive” on trade. Carney expressed interest in meeting President Xi Jinping to stabilize relations. Reuters and the Canadian PM’s office corroborate this.
  • June 2025 Phone Call: Verified. Carney and Li spoke in early June, agreeing to regularize communication and address trade, with no “deep-seated conflicts” cited by Chinese state media.
  • 100% Tariff on Chinese EVs: True. Canada imposed this in October 2024, mirroring U.S. policy under Biden (later escalated by Trump), to protect domestic industry. It strained China-Canada ties, prompting Chinese retaliation on Canadian canola.
  • Saskatchewan Trade Mission: Accurate. Premier Scott Moe led a September 6-12, 2025, mission to China, focusing on easing tariffs on canola, peas, and pork. Western provinces like Saskatchewan and British Columbia have lobbied Ottawa for normalized China ties due to export reliance.
  • Carney’s Quote on U.S. Relationship: Direct match. In March 2025, amid Trump-era tariffs, Carney stated, “The old relationship we had with the United States… is over,” signaling a pivot from deep integration. This was in response to U.S. threats of 25-35% tariffs on Canadian goods.
  • Canada-U.S. Tensions and Tariffs: Substantiated but framed dramatically. U.S. tariffs on Canadian steel, aluminum, and autos persist into 2025, with Canada retaliating (e.g., 25% on U.S. products, partially lifted September 1, 2025). Public sentiment has soured, with “Buy Canadian” campaigns and provincial boycotts of U.S. alcohol and goods. However, the article’s claim of U.S. deriding Canada as the “51st state” echoes Trump rhetoric but isn’t a formal policy statement.
  • China as Second-Largest Trading Partner: Partially accurate but exaggerated. The U.S. dominates (75-80% of trade), with China at ~10-13% (second for imports in some metrics, but overall third behind the EU). Post-tariff diversification has boosted China slightly, but the U.S. remains irreplaceable.
  • Expert Quote from Liu Dan: Liu is a real research fellow at Guangdong University of Foreign Studies’ Center for Regional Country Studies (or Canadian Studies variant), frequently quoted in Chinese media on Canada-China issues. Her views align with CCP lines, e.g., criticizing Canada’s “values-based diplomacy.” The specific quotes appear tailored for this piece, as no independent Western verification exists.
  • Public Boycotts of U.S. Goods/Travel: Evidence exists for grassroots movements and provincial actions (e.g., pulling U.S. spirits from shelves), fueled by tariffs. Polls show declining U.S. favorability, but widespread “boycotts” are more anecdotal than nationwide, amplified in Canadian media like CBC.

Minor fake element: The article implies a seamless “recalibration” under Carney, but reviews of the EV tariff continue, with industry (e.g., Ford) urging retention. No full reversal yet.

Advancing CCP Interests

Global Times, under the People’s Daily umbrella, routinely promotes Beijing’s worldview, often portraying China as a benevolent partner while depicting the West as unreliable or aggressive. This article exemplifies:

  • Positive Self-Presentation: China is framed as consistently viewing Canada as a “partner” open to cooperation in energy, green tech, and agriculture. It ignores past tensions like the 2018 Huawei arrest, Meng Wanzhou detention, or China’s consular detentions of Canadians (e.g., Kovrig and Spavor). Beijing’s “openness” conveniently omits its own tariffs on Canadian canola in retaliation.
  • Demonization of the U.S.: The U.S. is cast as volatile and humiliating, forcing Canada into subservience (“51st state”). This exploits real tariff disputes to erode trust in the U.S.-led alliance, aligning with CCP anti-hegemony rhetoric. It downplays mutual benefits of USMCA and NATO ties.
  • Amplification of Internal Canadian Divisions: Provincial calls for China engagement are highlighted to suggest a grassroots push against Ottawa’s “U.S.-following” stance, implying Carney’s policy is inevitable and popular. This sows discord in Canadian unity, a common CCP tactic.
  • Use of Affiliated Experts: Liu Dan’s quotes reinforce the narrative without counterpoints. As a Guangdong-based scholar, her views likely reflect state-guided research, lacking balance (e.g., no mention of security concerns like Chinese interference in Canadian elections, as probed by CSIS).

These elements serve propaganda by urging Canada to prioritize “national interests” (i.e., trade with China) over alliances, potentially isolating it from Five Eyes partners.

Shaping a Narrative

The article employs selective framing to construct a story of Canadian “awakening”:

  • Victimhood and Betrayal: Canada is depicted as blindly loyal to the U.S., only to be “humiliated,” leading to reflection on “excessive dependence.” This frames U.S. actions as punitive, ignoring Canada’s strategic choices (e.g., aligning on EVs for North American supply chains).
  • Pragmatism vs. Ideology: Carney’s “economic focus” contrasts with Trudeau’s alleged “political strife,” positioning China ties as rational and inevitable. It omits Carney’s continuations of Trudeau-era policies, like foreign interference inquiries targeting China.
  • Questioning Feasibility: The title and conclusion pose a rhetorical question about escaping “U.S. shadow,” conceding dependence but implying progress toward a “pragmatic path” with China. This hedges while planting seeds of doubt in the U.S. alliance.
  • Omission of Risks: No discussion of Chinese human rights issues, IP theft allegations, or economic coercion (e.g., canola bans). Cooperation potential is idealized, ignoring barriers like Canada’s Magnitsky sanctions on Chinese officials.

This framing encourages readers (especially Chinese audiences) to see Beijing as a stable alternative, while subtly pressuring Canada via public opinion.

Balanced Facts Amid Heavy Bias

The Global Times article is ~90% factually sound, drawing on real events like the Li-Carney meeting and U.S. tariffs to build its case. However, minor exaggerations (e.g., trade partner ranking, boycott scale) and the absence of a June call in initial Western reports (later confirmed in Chinese sources) suggest selective sourcing. Its propaganda shines through in pro-China glorification and U.S. vilification, while framing manipulates the narrative to promote Beijing’s “win-win” diplomacy.

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