In the tense geopolitical climate of January 2026, questions about Latin American military capabilities have surged amid escalating US threats under President Donald Trump. Drawing on recent developments, including a US strike in Venezuela and the abduction of President Nicolas Maduro, we examine military rankings, budgets, and strategic realities. While Latin America boasts some asymmetrical advantages, conventional inferiority to the US raises doubts about effective resistance.
Trump’s Aggressive Stance Toward Latin America
President Trump’s administration has intensified focus on Latin America, targeting nations like Colombia, Cuba, and Mexico over drug trafficking and other US interests. The recent US military operation in Venezuela, resulting in Maduro’s abduction, has heightened fears of broader interventions. This echoes a long history of US involvement in the region, from the Banana Wars of the late 19th and early 20th centuries—driven by corporate interests—to Cold War-era operations overthrowing governments and the 1989 invasion of Panama to remove Manuel Noriega. Despite the 1934 “Good Neighbor Policy” pledging nonintervention, recent actions suggest a return to assertive policies.
Latin American countries show little enthusiasm for US involvement, but their ability to respond forcefully is limited. In conventional warfare involving tanks, aircraft, and naval forces, the US holds overwhelming superiority. The region’s militaries lag in active personnel, equipment, and budgets, making a direct confrontation unlikely to succeed.
Assessing Latin American Military Capabilities: Rankings and Resources
According to 2025 global firepower assessments, Latin American nations rank far below the US, which leads the world with a defense budget of $895 billion—3.1% of its GDP—and outspending the next 10 largest military budgets combined. Key regional players include:
- Brazil: Ranked 11th globally, the strongest in Latin America.
- Mexico: 32nd globally.
- Colombia: 46th.
- Venezuela: 50th.
- Cuba: 67th.
These rankings highlight deficiencies in military aircraft, combat tanks, and naval assets compared to the US. However, Latin America surpasses the US in paramilitary forces, which could enable asymmetrical warfare—unconventional tactics blending with regular forces. For instance:
- Mexico’s drug cartels, such as the Zetas, function as de facto paramilitaries with military-grade weapons, often challenging state control.
- Venezuela’s pro-government “colectivos” serve as armed civilian enforcers with state tolerance.
- Colombia’s right-wing paramilitaries, rooted in the 1980s and influenced by external advisers, have evolved into criminal entities despite partial demobilization in the mid-2000s.
- Cuba boasts the world’s third-largest paramilitary force, with 1.14 million members in militias like the Territorial Troops, designed for defense against external threats.
Despite these elements, the overall capacity for a forceful response remains low. Regional divisions and a lack of unified alliances further hinder coordinated action against US threats.
Are Latin American Countries Capable of Responding to Trump with Force?
No, Latin American countries are not capable of mounting a significant forceful response to Trump-era US threats in a conventional sense. Their militaries lack the resources to deter or counter US interventions effectively. While paramilitary and guerrilla-style tactics could prolong conflicts or inflict costs, they are unlikely to alter outcomes in a direct clash. Historical precedents, such as US operations in the region, underscore this imbalance. Instead, diplomatic resistance, international alliances, or economic measures might offer more viable paths, though military deterrence appears out of reach.
Will Brazil Also Join in Responding to Trump?
Brazil, as Latin America’s military powerhouse ranked 11th globally, could play a pivotal role in any regional response. However, there is no clear indication that Brazil would join a forceful counter to US actions. Its superior regional standing in metrics like personnel and equipment positions it as a potential leader, but political and economic ties to the US may discourage involvement. Brazil’s history of neutrality in intra-regional conflicts and focus on domestic issues further suggest reluctance. If tensions escalate, Brazil might opt for diplomatic support rather than military engagement, avoiding direct confrontation with a superior power. Ultimately, without explicit alliances or shared threats targeting Brazil directly, its participation remains uncertain and unlikely in a forceful capacity.
War Situation?
Latin America is not currently facing an outright war situation, but revived tensions from US threats and the Venezuela incident signal a precarious escalation. The region experiences heightened alert rather than active conflict, with no widespread mobilization or declarations of war. Trump’s rhetoric and actions have stirred historical grievances, potentially leading to proxy struggles or limited interventions rather than full-scale war. Paramilitary activities and internal divisions could exacerbate instability, but a unified war front against the US appears improbable given military disparities. Monitoring diplomatic channels and international responses will be key to assessing if this evolves into broader hostilities.
