The most consequential question surrounding Imran Khan’s imprisonment may no longer be simply how long he will remain behind bars. It is what could happen to Pakistan’s political system if his imprisonment were to end in a Mohamed Morsi-style tragedy.
This is a hypothetical scenario, not a prediction. There is no established evidence that Imran Khan is destined to die in custody. However, the comparison has entered Pakistan’s political debate after Khan reportedly drew parallels between his situation and that of Egypt’s former president Mohamed Morsi, while his family and legal representatives have raised serious concerns about his health and detention conditions. The Pakistani government rejects allegations of deliberate mistreatment and says Khan has received repeated medical examinations and appropriate care.
Mohamed Morsi Is a Warning, Not a Template
Mohamed Morsi became Egypt’s first freely elected civilian president following the 2011 uprising. He was removed by the military in 2013 and died during a court hearing in 2019 after years in detention.
Human Rights Watch documented prolonged isolation, inadequate medical care and severe restrictions on family contact before his death, and called for an independent investigation.
The Morsi comparison is therefore politically powerful because it involves more than the death of a former president. It raises a larger question about what happens when a popular political leader becomes trapped in a confrontation between an elected political movement and a powerful state establishment.
But Pakistan is not Egypt, and the two political systems should not be treated as identical.
The comparison is useful only as a warning about possible political consequences, not as proof that the same chain of events will occur.
Khan’s Health Has Turned a Political Conflict Into an Institutional Test
The immediate issue is Khan’s health.
Pakistan’s Supreme Court ordered on August 18 that Khan be transferred from prison to Shifa International Hospital in Islamabad for treatment and directed that a medical panel, including his personal doctor, participate in his care.
The episode subsequently became controversial, with Khan’s party and legal team questioning whether the court’s instructions were fully implemented. The government has disputed those allegations, saying security concerns influenced the arrangements and that medical examinations did not reveal the serious condition alleged by Khan’s supporters.
That disagreement is important because it changes the political character of the issue.
It is no longer simply Imran Khan versus the government.
It increasingly involves the relationship between the judiciary, executive authorities, prison administration, opposition, military establishment and public opinion.
If Khan’s health deteriorates further, every institution involved could face questions about its responsibility.
Who Would Benefit First? The Establishment
In a narrow political calculation, the military establishment could appear to be the biggest immediate beneficiary if Khan were permanently removed from the political battlefield.
Khan has remained a powerful political symbol despite being imprisoned since 2023. His party has continued to mobilise supporters, and his confrontation with Pakistan’s security establishment remains one of the defining political conflicts of the country.
Removing Khan physically from the equation could therefore appear to eliminate the central personality around whom the opposition has been organised.
But that calculation contains a major weakness.
Eliminating a political leader does not necessarily eliminate the political movement behind him.
Indeed, the opposite can happen.
The “Martyrdom Effect” Could Transform PTI
If Khan were to die in prison under disputed circumstances, PTI could potentially transform his imprisonment and death into the central narrative of its political identity.
A living Khan can be restricted by prison regulations.
A dead Khan cannot be imprisoned again.
His speeches, political history, family and supporters could continue carrying his message, while his death could become a permanent symbol of resistance against what supporters describe as state repression.
This is where the Morsi comparison becomes strategically significant.
Morsi’s death did not erase the political conflict surrounding his removal. Instead, his detention and death became part of the broader narrative about Egypt’s post-2013 political order. Human Rights Watch later cited concerns that Egypt’s treatment of Morsi involved prolonged isolation and inadequate medical care.
A similar dynamic in Pakistan could make Khan more politically powerful as a symbol than as a prisoner.
PTI Could Lose Its Leader but Gain a Stronger Narrative
The second major potential beneficiary could therefore be PTI, although this would depend heavily on whether the party could remain united.
Khan’s absence would create a leadership vacuum. Rival factions could emerge. Questions about succession, strategy and negotiations with the state could intensify.
But simultaneously, his death could provide PTI with a simple political narrative:
“They could imprison him, but they could not defeat him.”
That type of narrative can be extremely powerful in electoral politics.
It could potentially attract not only loyal PTI voters but also citizens who do not necessarily agree with Khan’s policies but object to the idea of an opposition leader dying in state custody.
That would make the political consequences much wider than the existing PTI support base.
Would PML-N Really Be the Biggest Winner?
At first glance, Pakistan’s ruling political parties could appear to benefit.
If Khan disappeared permanently from the political contest, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and its allies would face one less powerful opposition personality.
But politically, this could become a Pyrrhic victory.
A government can compete against an opposition leader.
It can defeat a party at the ballot box.
But if a former prime minister dies in custody amid allegations of medical neglect, the government could face questions that go beyond normal electoral competition.
The government has already rejected accusations of cruelty, solitary confinement and medical neglect, saying Khan has received extensive medical attention and numerous visits since his imprisonment.
Therefore, any future deterioration in Khan’s health would likely trigger an intense dispute over competing versions of events.
The political battle would become a battle over credibility.
The Judiciary Could Become the Unexpected Loser
Perhaps the most important institution in this scenario would be Pakistan’s judiciary.
The Supreme Court has already intervened directly in Khan’s medical treatment.
If Khan subsequently suffered a severe medical crisis, critics could ask whether court orders were properly implemented.
That would place the judiciary in an uncomfortable position.
If the court’s orders were followed, responsibility would shift toward the authorities implementing them.
If they were not followed, the issue could become a direct challenge to judicial authority.
Either way, the Khan case could become a test of whether Pakistan’s institutions can enforce their own decisions when those decisions conflict with powerful political and security interests.
The Military Establishment Could Face the Biggest Long-Term Risk
This is the paradox at the centre of the entire debate.
The institution that might appear to gain the most from Khan’s permanent removal could also face the greatest long-term political damage.
Pakistan’s military has historically been one of the country’s most powerful institutions. But Khan’s imprisonment has already generated intense domestic and international attention.
A disputed death in custody could internationalise the issue even further.
Foreign governments, international human-rights organisations, parliamentarians, diaspora groups and global media could demand investigations.
The question would no longer be:
“Why is Imran Khan in prison?”
It could become:
“Who was responsible for what happened to him?”
That is a far more difficult political question to manage.
International Pressure Would Probably Increase
Khan’s international profile could make the consequences particularly significant.
Former cricket captains have already publicly appealed for proper medical treatment for him. A recent appeal involving 22 former international cricket captains renewed pressure on Pakistan’s government over his treatment.
If Khan were to die in custody, the reaction would likely extend far beyond traditional political circles.
His status as a former international cricket star would give the story an unusual global reach.
The issue could become a human-rights controversy, a diplomatic problem and a reputational challenge for Pakistan simultaneously.
India Could Watch the Crisis Closely — But Would Not Automatically Benefit
There is also a regional dimension.
A severe political crisis inside Pakistan could temporarily distract Islamabad from economic, security and foreign-policy priorities.
India could potentially gain diplomatic space from Pakistan’s internal instability, but it would also face risks.
A destabilised Pakistan is not necessarily beneficial for India.
Political instability in a nuclear-armed state could increase uncertainty over border tensions, militancy, economic disruption and regional security.
Therefore, it would be simplistic to argue that India would automatically be a winner.
China Also Has an Interest in Stability
China faces a similar calculation.
Beijing’s priority in Pakistan is generally strategic stability, economic connectivity and the security of Chinese citizens and projects, particularly under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
A major political crisis could complicate those interests.
China might therefore prefer a managed political settlement rather than a dramatic confrontation between Khan’s supporters and the state.
For Beijing, stability is likely to matter more than which individual politician dominates Pakistan.
The Biggest Winner Could Be Neither PTI nor PML-N
There is another possibility.
The ultimate beneficiary of a Morsi-style crisis could be no political party at all.
If Khan’s death produced mass protests, institutional confrontation and political polarisation, Pakistan’s entire democratic system could become weaker.
That could create space for greater state control over political activity rather than strengthening any civilian party.
In that sense, the biggest winner might be the broader security-centric model of governance, rather than a particular political organisation.
But that would come at a high price.
The Biggest Loser Could Be Pakistan’s Democracy
The central issue is therefore not whether Khan’s opponents would gain a few electoral seats.
It is whether Pakistan could maintain public confidence in constitutional politics.
If citizens begin to believe that political disputes cannot be resolved through elections, courts and parliament, they may increasingly conclude that political power is determined outside democratic institutions.
That would be much more dangerous than one politician’s imprisonment.
It could create a lasting crisis of legitimacy.
Why Khan’s Survival Could Actually Be Better for His Rivals
There is an important strategic paradox here.
Khan alive in prison remains a manageable political opponent. Khan dead under disputed circumstances could become an uncontrollable political symbol.
His rivals can negotiate with a living politician.
They can challenge his party.
They can contest his supporters.
They can argue against his policies.
But they cannot negotiate with a martyr narrative once it becomes embedded in political culture.
This is why, from a purely strategic perspective, ensuring transparent, credible and independent medical treatment for Khan may actually serve the interests of those who oppose him.
It removes the most dangerous conspiracy theories before they can become politically irreversible.
The Real Test Is Transparency, Not Political Loyalty
The solution to the controversy is therefore relatively straightforward in principle.
Khan’s medical condition should be independently assessed by qualified doctors.
His treatment should be transparent.
Court orders should be demonstrably implemented.
His family and legal team should have lawful access.
And any allegations of mistreatment should be investigated through credible institutions rather than dismissed solely as political propaganda.
That approach would protect Khan’s rights while simultaneously protecting the credibility of the state.
If the Worst Happens, Everyone Could Lose
The phrase “who benefits most?” may therefore have a counterintuitive answer.
In the immediate term, Khan’s political opponents could appear to gain.
In the medium term, PTI could gain a powerful martyr narrative.
The military establishment could temporarily remove its most prominent political challenger but risk a much larger legitimacy crisis.
PML-N could gain electoral space but face accusations that could damage its credibility.
The judiciary could become central to the controversy.
Foreign powers could gain diplomatic leverage but would also face a more unstable Pakistan.
And ordinary Pakistanis could inherit an even deeper political divide.
The Morsi Lesson for Pakistan
The most important lesson from the Morsi case is not that Imran Khan will meet the same fate.
It is that the treatment of a political prisoner can become more politically consequential than the original political dispute.
Morsi’s death followed years of controversy over isolation and medical care, and Human Rights Watch called for an independent investigation into the circumstances surrounding his death.
Pakistan now has an opportunity to avoid allowing a similar controversy to develop.
The safest path for everyone — including Khan’s opponents — is transparent medical treatment, credible judicial oversight and a political process capable of resolving disagreements without turning imprisonment into a permanent political battlefield.
Because if Imran Khan were ever to die in custody under circumstances that remained disputed, the biggest winner might not be the government, the military or PTI.
The biggest winner could be the politics of permanent confrontation.
And the biggest loser could be Pakistan’s democratic credibility.
