Türkiye has reopened one of the most difficult debates in international diplomacy: whether the United Nations can remain credible while five countries retain the power to block substantive Security Council action.
Speaking ahead of and during the 81st UN General Assembly, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called for the abolition of the Security Council veto, the end of permanent membership and a system in which Security Council members would be elected by the General Assembly for fixed terms. His argument is not literally for abolishing the United Nations or eliminating the Security Council altogether. Rather, Türkiye is proposing a UN in which the Security Council would operate without a privileged permanent five.
The proposal is ambitious, controversial and extremely difficult to implement. But it also reflects a broader question confronting the international system: can a global institution created after the Second World War adequately represent a world whose economic, political and strategic balance has changed dramatically?
The Real Meaning Behind “The World Is Bigger Than Five”
Erdoğan’s criticism is built around a slogan he has repeatedly used since at least 2019: “The world is bigger than five.” The five are the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom—the permanent members of the Security Council, each with veto power.
Türkiye argues that the present structure gives disproportionate authority to a small group of states. In Erdoğan’s latest proposal, simply adding countries such as India, Brazil, Japan or representatives from Africa as new permanent members would not solve the fundamental problem. Ankara’s argument is that creating more permanent veto holders would expand the privileged structure rather than eliminate it.
Instead, Türkiye proposes a rotating model. Security Council members would be elected by the General Assembly for fixed periods and would have to seek renewed support if they wanted to return. This would theoretically make the Council more accountable to the wider UN membership.
That distinction is important. Türkiye is not simply demanding “more seats.” It is challenging the underlying hierarchy of the Security Council.
Why Is Türkiye Raising the Issue Now?
The timing matters.
The international system is facing simultaneous wars, geopolitical rivalries, energy disruptions, supply-chain vulnerabilities and competing regional security arrangements. Erdoğan argued that recent crises have demonstrated the limitations of leaving major international decisions to a small number of capitals.
The UN itself has acknowledged that confidence in multilateral institutions faces serious pressure. During Erdoğan’s General Assembly address, he argued that the organisation created to maintain international peace and security has struggled to fulfil that mission and again invoked the idea that the world cannot permanently be governed through the preferences of five powers.
From Ankara’s perspective, this creates an opening for institutional reform.
The argument is particularly relevant when the Security Council becomes divided over major conflicts. When one or more permanent members use the veto—or when geopolitical divisions make agreement impossible—the Council can struggle to produce collective action.
Türkiye’s criticism therefore focuses less on the existence of the UN itself and more on the decision-making architecture inside it.
Türkiye Wants More Power for the General Assembly
One of the most significant elements of Erdoğan’s proposal is the attempt to rebalance the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly.
The General Assembly includes the broader UN membership, while the Security Council has primary responsibility for international peace and security. Erdoğan argues that the Assembly should have a stronger role and that the Security Council should become more representative and accountable to it.
This could potentially transform the political character of the UN.
Instead of international security being heavily shaped by five permanent powers, Ankara’s proposed model would give elected members a stronger role and make continued participation dependent on the support of the wider membership.
In political terms, this represents a shift from privileged permanence toward rotating legitimacy.
Whether such a system would actually make the UN more effective is another question.
The Biggest Problem: The P5 Would Have to Agree
This is where Türkiye’s proposal encounters perhaps its greatest obstacle.
Changing the structure of the Security Council requires an amendment to the UN Charter. Under Article 108, amendments require approval by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of UN members, including all five permanent Security Council members.
In other words, the countries whose privileges Türkiye wants to remove would themselves have to approve the legal transformation.
That makes the proposal extraordinarily difficult to implement.
Abolishing the veto would require the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom to accept the removal of their own special voting authority.
There is already evidence of resistance. Russia has said it supports Security Council reform and potentially expanding permanent membership, but it has also stated that permanent membership and the veto are important elements of the UN structure.
That disagreement illustrates the central diplomatic divide.
Türkiye is questioning whether permanent power is compatible with a changing world. Russia’s position, by contrast, indicates that reform does not necessarily mean abandoning the existing privileges.
Türkiye Is Also Challenging the “Add More Permanent Members” Solution
For years, much of the debate over Security Council reform has focused on expanding permanent membership.
Countries such as India, Japan, Germany and Brazil have sought greater representation, while African states have also pushed for stronger representation in the Council.
Türkiye’s position is different.
Ankara says adding new permanent members could make the Council more representative geographically but would not necessarily make it more democratic. If the new members received veto rights, the number of states capable of blocking decisions would increase without changing the principle of permanent privilege.
This creates a fundamental choice in the reform debate.
Should the UN expand the existing system, or should it rethink the system itself?
Türkiye is clearly advocating the second approach.
Why Türkiye Thinks Regional Powers Should Have a Bigger Role
Türkiye’s argument also reflects its own position in international politics.
Ankara is a NATO member, a major military power, a Black Sea actor and a country with relationships across Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and the wider Islamic world. It has maintained channels with both Russia and Ukraine and has sought diplomatic roles in regional crises. Euronews notes that Türkiye is attempting to position itself for a broader role in European security while transatlantic relations face significant pressure.
This makes UN reform particularly relevant to Ankara’s foreign-policy ambitions.
A Security Council based on rotating regional representation could potentially create more opportunities for countries such as Türkiye to shape international security debates without requiring them to become permanent members.
That does not mean Türkiye’s proposal should be understood simply as a campaign for its own influence. The proposal is presented by Ankara as part of a wider institutional argument involving developing countries, regional responsibility and greater representation. But the structure it advocates would also create a different diplomatic environment in which regional powers could periodically gain greater responsibility.
The European Dimension Cannot Be Ignored
There is also an important European dimension to Erdoğan’s argument.
France and the United Kingdom are two of the five permanent members, meaning Europe has two seats in the P5 despite the European Union not itself having a permanent seat.
At the same time, Germany has sought a greater role in Security Council decision-making, while broader European debates increasingly question how the continent should contribute to global security.
Türkiye’s own relationship with Europe adds another layer.
Erdoğan argued at the General Assembly that European security cannot be strengthened while Türkiye is excluded from Europe’s security architecture. Euronews reports that Ankara is seeking a broader role as NATO’s second-largest military and as a country with significant defence capabilities.
Therefore, UN reform is connected to a larger Turkish argument about the redistribution of international responsibility.
Could a Veto-Free Security Council Become More Democratic—or More Divided?
This is where the debate becomes complicated.
Removing the veto could reduce the ability of one powerful state to block a Security Council resolution supported by most other members. That could make the institution appear more representative.
But the veto also exists partly because the UN’s founders recognised that major powers were unlikely to accept a system in which binding security decisions could be imposed upon them without their consent.
Abolishing the veto could therefore create a different problem: would major powers continue to accept Security Council decisions if they no longer possessed a special mechanism to protect their core interests?
That is one of the central unresolved questions behind Türkiye’s proposal.
A more representative Council could potentially increase legitimacy. But legitimacy and effectiveness are not automatically the same thing.
Is Türkiye Calling for a UN Without the UNSC?
The headline question—“Why Türkiye wants a UN without UNSC?”—needs an important clarification.
Türkiye is not proposing the abolition of the United Nations Security Council itself. Erdoğan’s proposal seeks a Security Council without permanent members and without the veto, while strengthening the General Assembly.
That difference is crucial.
The Turkish vision is essentially a UN without the current P5-dominated Security Council, not a UN without a Security Council.
Ankara wants to preserve the institution while changing who controls it and how decisions are made.
Can the 1945 System Survive the 21st Century?
Türkiye’s proposal ultimately raises a question much larger than Turkish foreign policy.
The Security Council was created in the aftermath of the Second World War. Its permanent membership reflected the major victorious powers of that period. Since then, the global economy, population distribution, technological landscape and geopolitical balance have changed substantially.
Yet the fundamental P5 structure remains.
Erdoğan’s argument is that institutional legitimacy cannot depend indefinitely on a geopolitical hierarchy established eight decades ago. The UN’s own current reform discussions demonstrate that Security Council composition and representation remain unresolved issues. Türkiye has also previously argued in UN discussions that the veto can undermine sovereign equality and decision-making.
But changing the system requires more than political speeches.
It requires agreement from the very powers that benefit from the existing structure.
Türkiye’s UN Challenge Is Bigger Than the Veto
The significance of Erdoğan’s latest intervention is therefore not necessarily whether the veto disappears tomorrow. It is that Türkiye is trying to shift the language of UN reform from “Who else should join the permanent five?” toward “Should permanent privileges exist at all?”
That is a much more fundamental challenge.
The debate now places three competing models on the table: preserving the current P5 system, expanding permanent membership, or creating a rotating Security Council without permanent veto holders.
Türkiye is openly advocating the third model.
Whether that vision can attract a sufficiently broad coalition inside the General Assembly remains uncertain. And even if substantial support emerges, the UN Charter’s amendment requirements mean that the five permanent members would ultimately remain central to any legally binding transformation.
For Ankara, however, the strategic objective may extend beyond immediate institutional change. By placing the veto itself at the centre of the global debate, Türkiye is positioning itself as a leading voice for a different model of international governance—one in which regional powers and the wider UN membership have a greater role in shaping decisions that affect the entire world.
The real question, therefore, may not be whether Türkiye can abolish the Security Council veto alone. It is whether the international community is prepared to reconsider a global security system designed in 1945 for the geopolitical realities of 2026.
