Breaking the Waters: Modi’s Regional Gambit, Unravelling of South Asian Equilibrium

In the shadow of the suspended Indus Waters Treaty and escalating India-Pakistan hostilities following the Pahalgam attack, this article explores how New Delhi’s regional dominance agenda—anchored in the assertive Doval Doctrine—is reshaping the political and strategic architecture of South Asia. Drawing on grounded analysis, it situates India’s manoeuvres, including doctrinal shifts toward Cold Start and treaty revocation, within the framework of Offensive Realism, revealing a deliberate recalibration of power rather than reactive diplomacy. The piece also delves into the strategic implications of these moves: how they strain the political economies of both nations, amplify nuclear brinkmanship, and trigger realignments among global powers like the U.S. and China. With Pakistan declaring the treaty’s suspension an act of war and invoking the fragile geopolitical calculus of Balochistan, the region teeters on the edge of conflict.

Introduction: The Indus Waters Treaty, brokered by the World Bank in 1960, has been a cornerstone of India-Pakistan relations, surviving multiple conflicts. Under the treaty, India controls the eastern rivers (Beas, Ravi, Sutlej), while Pakistan has rights over the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab). India’s recent suspension of the treaty, following the Pahalgam attack, marks an unprecedented move, effectively weaponizing water in the geopolitical arena.​

While India’s current infrastructure limits immediate alterations to water flows, the suspension allows New Delhi to withhold vital hydrological data, crucial for Pakistan’s agricultural planning. Given that agriculture constitutes a significant portion of Pakistan’s GDP and employs a large segment of its population, any disruption in water supply could have dire economic and humanitarian consequences.​

Pakistan has vehemently condemned India’s actions, with officials labelling the suspension of the IWT as an “act of war.” The Pakistani government has taken reciprocal measures, including closing its airspace to Indian flights, expelling Indian diplomats, and suspending trade relations. Furthermore, Pakistan has threatened to approach international forums, such as the United Nations and the International Court of Justice, to challenge India’s unilateral decision.​

The situation has also reignited discussions around Balochistan, with Pakistani leaders accusing India of fomenting unrest in the region. By linking the IWT suspension to broader allegations of interference, Pakistan aims to garner international attention and portray India as a destabilising force in the region.​

Theoretical Framing: Power, Preemption, and the Logic of Offensive Realism

To make sense of India’s evolving security posture in South Asia—especially in the wake of its increasingly confrontational stance toward Pakistan—one must look beyond immediate provocations and delve into the strategic rationale underpinning its actions. The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), the abrogation of Article 370, and doctrinal shifts in military engagement are not isolated responses but instead appear aligned with a broader logic grounded in the Realist tradition of international relations, particularly Offensive Realism.

At the heart of this perspective is the assumption that, in an anarchic international system, states cannot rely on others for their security and are thus compelled to maximize power to deter threats and preserve sovereignty (Mearsheimer, 2001). This holds especially true for regional powers like India, which, having achieved a degree of economic and military ascendancy, now appear intent on shaping the regional architecture to reflect their strategic preferences.

Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and with National Security Advisor Ajit Doval shaping security doctrine, India’s foreign policy has adopted a more assertive, even pre-emptive, flavour. The Doval Doctrine emphasizes proactive deterrence, covert capabilities, and punitive responses to perceived threats emanating from Pakistan, particularly those tied to cross-border terrorism and asymmetric warfare (Pant, 2021). It envisions a security strategy where offense is not just the best defense—but the first option. In this view, legacy agreements like the IWT, which were forged in a different geopolitical era, are increasingly seen by Indian strategists as outdated constraints on sovereign prerogative.

Pakistan’s response—framing India’s move as tantamount to an act of war—is equally steeped in Realist logic. Islamabad, facing growing diplomatic isolation and economic fragility, has long leveraged its nuclear capability as an asymmetric equalizer. The potential loss of diplomatic footholds like the IWT risks not only strategic imbalance but also economic upheaval. In Realist terms, Pakistan’s reaction is less about water and more about preserving strategic parity (Kapur, 2020).

This escalatory trajectory fits squarely within Mearsheimer’s conception of Offensive Realism, where major powers are not satisfied with equilibrium but actively seek regional hegemony to pre-empt threats before they materialize (Mearsheimer, 2001). India’s expanding infrastructure in Kashmir, its focus on information warfare and AI-driven military modernization, and its recalibration of strategic partnerships reflect a deliberate move toward consolidating regional dominance, especially over Pakistan, which India increasingly views as a diminishing yet disruptive neighbour.

Globally, this power struggle has not gone unnoticed. The United States, balancing its interest in South Asian stability with its strategic courtship of India as a counterweight to China, has largely refrained from criticism. This passive tolerance indirectly reinforces India’s assertiveness. Meanwhile, China, deeply invested in Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), views Indian pre-emption as a threat to its own regional interests. Its response has been cautious but deliberate: quiet diplomatic support for Pakistan, increased military patrols along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and economic reassurances to Islamabad (Chakma, 2022).

Thus, the current impasse over the IWT and broader India-Pakistan relations is better understood not as isolated diplomatic breakdowns, but as symptoms of a deeper, structural competition. As Offensive Realism suggests, peace between rivals like India and Pakistan is always tenuous, unless either overwhelming deterrence or a significant shift in external pressures forces restraint (Tellis, 2022). In the absence of such stabilizers, what we are witnessing is not an aberration, but a return to the core dynamics of regional power politics.

Regional and Global Repercussions

The unilateral suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) by India signals a sharp departure from the historically upheld norms of water diplomacy and introduces significant volatility into the regional political economy. For Pakistan — a country where over 90% of freshwater resources are dependent on the Indus River system and nearly 38% of the labour force is employed in agriculture — even marginal disruptions in water flows could lead to agricultural shocks, food insecurity, and macroeconomic instability. The implications are especially severe in water-stressed regions like Sindh and Balochistan, where water scarcity could exacerbate provincial grievances and deepen internal political fissures.

If India were to invoke the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD), a strategy developed post-2001 for rapid, limited conventional incursions into Pakistani territory with the aim of punitive retaliation while avoiding full-scale war, it would fundamentally shift the region from deterrence-based equilibrium to strategic brinkmanship. Under such circumstances, Pakistan’s declared position of Full Spectrum Deterrence, which includes tactical nuclear weapon use in response to conventional Indian incursions, raises the stakes for rapid escalation.

Comparison of Second-Strike capabilities

The table here provides an overview of both countries as the drums for a war have started beating vehemently on the media and vloggers’ outlets.

​Pakistan’s ability to maintain a credible second-strike capability in the event of a first-use nuclear scenario by India is a critical component of its national security strategy. This capability hinges on its nuclear arsenal’s survivability, its delivery systems’ effectiveness, and the robustness of its command-and-control infrastructure.​ Nonetheless, India’s conventional military superiority influences Pakistan’s strategic emphasis on nuclear deterrence to offset conventional disparities.​

Strategic Doctrines and Postures

The differing doctrines reflect each country’s strategic priorities and threat perceptions, contributing to the complexity of deterrence dynamics in the region.​ A look at the comparative strategic doctrines of both countries helps make a reasonable understanding that though both are ready not to use the nuclear arsenal first but both are also ready for a pre-emptive strike at any perceived breach of their red lines.

Strategic Fallout of Cold Start Doctrine: Possible Global Alignments

The United States: Strategic Dilemma: The U.S. finds itself caught between strategic interests and regional stability imperatives. While India is a crucial partner in the Indo-Pacific Strategy and a member of the Quad alliance, an Indian offensive could derail Washington’s attempts to maintain balance in Asia. The U.S. has historically played a behind-the-scenes diplomatic role during India-Pakistan crises (e.g., Kargil 1999, 2001–02 standoff, and Balakot 2019), and may push for de-escalation through backchannel diplomacy, economic levers, and conditional support for India’s broader strategic goals.

China: Strategic Opportunism and Economic Leverage: Pakistan’s “all-weather” ally and primary financier (worth over $ 60 billion) of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), will perceive any Indian military escalation as a threat to its regional investments and influence. If Cold Start is initiated near Gilgit-Baltistan or along regions tied to CPEC routes, China may provide logistical, military, diplomatic, or even limited intelligence support to Pakistan, short of direct intervention. Furthermore, Beijing could respond by increasing patrols along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), particularly in Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh, to stretch Indian military attention across multiple fronts. It may weaponize trade with India, as seen during the 2020 border clashes and even leverage its veto power at the UN Security Council to protect Pakistan diplomatically. Key Chinese goal will be to prevent further Indian dominance and ensure uninterrupted access to Gwadar and western transit routes.

Russia: Tactical Neutrality with Economic Eyes: While Russia has recently expanded defense ties with India (e.g., the S-400 missile deal), it maintains a diplomatic rapport with Islamabad and may assume a mediation role to avoid open Indo-Pakistani conflict that could destabilize Eurasian integration projects like the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). However, Russia would likely avoid taking sides militarily.

Gulf States and Turkey: Calculated Balancing: The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are deeply invested in both India (as trade partners and oil clients) and Pakistan (as labour sources and ideological allies). In a conflict scenario, GCC states would likely remain neutral but might push for peace through quiet diplomacy. However, oil remittances from Pakistanis working in the Gulf could plummet if the region is viewed as destabilized. India’s access to Gulf energy markets and expatriate remittances could also be at risk if the war destabilizes maritime security. Their initial response would likely be to call for restraint while exploring behind-the-scenes diplomacy. Turkey, however, could rhetorically

India’s Precarious Path Forward

India’s recent manoeuvres, underpinned by the Doval Doctrine, signify a transformative approach to regional strategy, emphasising assertiveness and unilateral action. While these actions aim to reinforce national security and project power, they carry the risk of escalating tensions into open conflict, especially given the nuclear capabilities of both India and Pakistan.​

The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty not only challenges the existing diplomatic framework but also sets a precedent for the politicisation of essential resources. As both nations navigate this precarious juncture, the imperative for dialogue, confidence-building measures, and adherence to international norms becomes ever more critical to prevent a descent into conflict.​

Strategic and Economic Consequences: A Narrative Perspective

The looming shadow of conflict, particularly in the context of India’s possible invocation of the Cold Start doctrine, brings with it severe strategic and economic consequences for both India and Pakistan—albeit in asymmetric ways.

For Pakistan, the repercussions would be immediate and destabilizing. Already grappling with mounting economic distress, any escalation with India would accelerate capital flight and deepen currency depreciation. Foreign investors and creditors, wary of political risk and potential sanctions, may rapidly withdraw or withhold essential financial support. This would severely hinder Pakistan’s import capacity, particularly for critical commodities like fuel and industrial inputs, further straining its energy sector.

In such a scenario, Islamabad’s reliance on external lifelines would intensify. China, already Pakistan’s principal strategic and economic partner through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), would be expected to step in with liquidity support. Similarly, the Gulf States may be called upon to provide emergency financial assistance. However, this increased dependency could come with geopolitical strings, compromising Pakistan’s strategic autonomy at a time when it needs it most.

Moreover, any military conflagration risks derailing Pakistan’s already precarious International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilization program. The resulting fiscal diversion toward defense spending and emergency response could jeopardize social welfare obligations, leading to public unrest in a society already burdened by inflation and structural unemployment. The state’s capacity to manage displaced populations, especially in border regions like Punjab and Balochistan, would also be severely tested.

On the other side, India, with its larger and more diversified $3.7 trillion economy, is structurally better positioned to absorb short-term shocks. However, this relative resilience does not make it immune. The mere spectre of war would elevate risk premiums, making foreign capital more cautious. While major investors may not withdraw immediately, the perception of India as a stable investment destination could suffer, particularly in industries reliant on predictable supply chains and political calm.

Prolonged engagement would also disrupt economic activity in key northern states such as Kashmir and Punjab, which serve as both sensitive conflict zones and vital economic arteries. Infrastructure damage, restricted civilian mobility, and logistical bottlenecks could have knock-on effects across India’s agrarian and manufacturing sectors.

Domestically, the Modi government may benefit from a short-term nationalist rally, capitalizing on heightened patriotic sentiment to reinforce political legitimacy. However, this comes at the potential cost of long-term economic strain. A sustained military build-up would divert public expenditure from critical areas such as health, education, and welfare, deepening socio-economic divides and straining fiscal balances. The risk is that a strategic gambit for regional dominance may come at the expense of inclusive growth and democratic credibility.

In sum, while India may win the short-term perception battle of strength, the long-term strategic and economic toll could be far more complex and enduring for both nations, especially in a world where markets, climate, and regional politics are increasingly interlinked and fragile.

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