In the ever-shifting landscape of Middle Eastern geopolitics, 2025 has marked a pivotal escalation in Israel’s campaign against Hamas. With ongoing conflicts in Gaza and beyond, a recent Israeli airstrike in Qatar’s capital, Doha, has thrust the Gulf nation into the spotlight. This article delves deep into whether Israel acted with Qatari consent, why Qatar’s defenses remained silent, the palpable fear among Arab nations, Israel’s operational footprint across borders, and a critical analysis of whether Arab countries have lost their edge against Israel.
Did Israel Take Action Against Hamas with the Consent of the Qatari Government?
The short answer: No. Israel’s strike on Hamas leadership in Doha appears to have been a unilateral operation, catching Qatar off guard and eliciting swift condemnation. Reports from multiple sources confirm explosions in residential areas housing Hamas’ political bureau, targeting senior figures involved in negotiations. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and Shin Bet claimed responsibility, describing it as a “precise strike” against architects of the October 7, 2023, attacks.
Qatar, long a haven for Hamas’ exiled leaders under a tacit understanding with the U.S. and Israel, reacted with outrage. The Qatari Foreign Ministry labeled it a “cowardly Israeli attack” and a “blatant violation of international law,” suspending its mediation role in Gaza ceasefire talks. There’s no evidence of prior consent; instead, speculation abounds that Qatar might have secretly welcomed the removal of Hamas figures to ease domestic and international pressures, though publicly it couldn’t admit this. This move shattered Doha’s image as a neutral mediator, highlighting how Israel’s “anywhere, anytime” doctrine against threats overrides diplomatic niceties. In a region where backchannel deals often blur lines, this strike underscores Israel’s willingness to risk alliances for security gains.
Qatar’s Defense
Qatar’s military response—or lack thereof—to the September 9 strike raises eyebrows, but it’s rooted in a mix of capability gaps, strategic alliances, and geopolitical calculus. Qatar’s armed forces, while modernized with U.S. and Turkish support, are modest: around 12,000 active personnel, focused on internal security rather than high-intensity conflicts. Its air defenses, including Patriot systems, are geared toward threats like Iranian missiles, not stealthy Israeli operations that likely evaded detection through advanced tactics.
More crucially, Qatar hosts the U.S. Central Command’s forward headquarters at Al Udeid Air Base, making any aggressive response risky—it could draw American ire or escalation. Reports suggest the U.S. had advance warning of the strike, implying tacit approval or at least non-interference. Qatar’s strategy has always leaned on soft power: mediation, investments, and alliances rather than confrontation. Engaging Israel militarily would jeopardize its role as a global diplomat and expose vulnerabilities. In essence, Qatar’s “defense” is diplomatic deterrence, not kinetic force—prioritizing survival in a volatile neighborhood over direct retaliation.
Did All Arab Countries are helpless?
Fear? Absolutely, but it’s nuanced—less outright terror and more calculated anxiety amid shifting alliances. In 2025, Israel’s strikes on Iran, Yemen, and now Qatar have amplified concerns across the Arab world. Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE publicly condemn Israel’s actions but privately applaud its weakening of Iranian proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah, fearing regional instability more than Israel itself.
The June 2025 Israel-Iran war, where Israel targeted nuclear sites with minimal Iranian retaliation, has solidified Israel’s image as an untouchable powerhouse. Arab nations, once unified against Israel in the 1960s-70s, now prioritize economic ties and U.S. protection. The Abraham Accords’ expansion has normalized relations with some, but escalations in Gaza and Lebanon fuel protests and diplomatic unease. Countries like Egypt and Jordan, with peace treaties, tread carefully to avoid domestic backlash. Overall, it’s not paralysis from fear but a pragmatic pivot: Arab states see Israel’s military edge as a fact of life, pushing them toward de-escalation rather than confrontation.
Israel Attacks:
Israel’s operations in 2020-2025 reflect a proactive “mowing the grass” strategy against perceived threats, extending far beyond its borders. Here’s a detailed list based on recent events:
- Palestine (Gaza and West Bank): Ongoing since 2023, with intensified ground and air campaigns. Over 46,000 reported deaths by mid-2025, including resumed strikes post-March ceasefire breakdown.
- Lebanon: Strikes against Hezbollah, including assassinations and border incursions, escalating in 2024-2025 amid cross-border fire.
- Syria: Frequent airstrikes on Iranian-linked targets, disrupting supply lines to Hezbollah.
- Iran: Direct attacks in June 2025, hitting nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, marking a paradigm shift in open warfare.
- Yemen: Operations against Houthi rebels, including U.S.-backed strikes on Sanaa in response to Red Sea attacks.
- Qatar: The September 9, 2025, strike on Hamas leaders in Doha, an unprecedented expansion into Gulf territory.
- Iraq and Others: Limited actions against Iranian militias, though less publicized.
These operations fuse intelligence and special forces, emphasizing preemption over occupation. Israel’s reach demonstrates its fusion of tech and alliances, but it risks broader alienation.
Have All Arab Countries Lost the Ability to Confront Israel?
Not entirely lost, but severely diminished. The 2025 landscape shows Arab states fragmented, with military asymmetries tilting heavily toward Israel. Historical coalitions (e.g., 1967 Six-Day War) have dissolved; today, normalization deals like the Abraham Accords sideline confrontation. Iran’s weakened proxies post-2025 war further erodes collective leverage.
Yet, it’s not impotence—Egypt and Saudi Arabia boast large forces, but internal divisions, outdated doctrines, and fear of U.S. backlash hinder action. Arab calls for Hamas to disarm signal a shift toward diplomacy over defiance. In a fresh angle, this “loss” is self-inflicted: prioritizing stability and economics over unity. Israel exploits this, but overreach could reignite pan-Arab solidarity.
Strengths and Weaknesses:
To visualize the military balance, here’s a comparative table based on Global Firepower rankings and expert analyses as of 2025. Metrics include active personnel, airpower, tech sophistication, and alliances.
| Country/Bloc | Strengths | Weaknesses | Global Rank (GFP 2025) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Israel | Advanced tech (Iron Dome, F-35s), superior intelligence, undeclared nukes, U.S. backing, rapid mobilization (170K active, 465K reserves). Dominant air and cyber superiority. | Small population/territory, high reliance on imports/reserves, vulnerable to prolonged attrition wars. | 15 |
| Egypt | Largest Arab army (440K active), strong ground forces, U.S.-supplied hardware (M1 Abrams tanks). Strategic Suez Canal control. | Outdated equipment in parts, economic strains limit modernization, internal security focus over external threats. | 13 |
| Saudi Arabia | Massive defense budget ($75B+), modern Western arms (F-15s, Patriots), oil wealth for rapid upgrades. | Poor combat experience, reliance on foreign contractors, internal divisions (Yemen quagmire exposed vulnerabilities). | 23 |
| UAE | High-tech forces (e.g., drones, cyber units), agile special ops, strong U.S./Israeli ties post-Abraham Accords. | Small size (65K active), dependence on expatriate personnel, limited strategic depth. | 19 |
| Jordan | Professional army, U.S.-trained special forces, border stability role. | Modest size (100K active), economic dependency, avoids direct conflicts to preserve monarchy. | 80 |
| Collective Arab States | Numerical superiority (millions in reserves), diverse geography for guerrilla tactics, potential for economic boycotts. | Fragmentation (no unified command), varying allegiances (some pro-Israel), outdated Soviet-era gear in many. | N/A (divided) |
Israel’s edge lies in qualitative superiority—tech and training—over Arab quantitative advantages. For Arabs, weaknesses stem from disunity; strengths could revive through alliances, but 2025 trends favor pragmatism over war.
In conclusion, Israel’s 2025 actions, from Doha to Tehran, redefine regional power plays. While Arab nations grapple with fear and fragmentation, the path forward may lie in renewed diplomacy rather than arms. As tensions simmer, the world watches: Will this lead to broader peace or deeper divides? Stay informed as events unfold.
