Few relationships in modern diplomacy have carried as much promise, pressure, sacrifice, disappointment, and strategic value as Pakistan–United States relations. The United States was among the first countries to recognize Pakistan after its independence in 1947. Since then, the two countries have passed through long periods of close cooperation, especially during the Cold War, the Afghan jihad against the former USSR invasion, and the post-9/11 war on terror. Yet the relationship has often suffered from a painful contradiction: whenever Washington needed Pakistan’s support, Pakistan was treated as a frontline ally; whenever American priorities shifted, Pakistan faced sanctions, restrictions, aid cuts, or strategic neglect.
Today, as the United States marks its 250th anniversary and speaks again of partnership, sovereignty, shared prosperity, trade, investment, critical minerals, economic cooperation, and regional peace, this is the right time to reflect honestly on the past and build a better future. U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Natalie Baker recently described the U.S.-Pakistan partnership as evolving on the basis of mutual respect, sovereignty, strength, and shared prosperity. This language is welcome. But for it to become meaningful, it must be translated into practical policy: removal of discriminatory restrictions, restoration of strategic trust, expanded market access, educational and technological cooperation, and a balanced approach toward South Asia.
Pakistan’s contribution to American strategic interests has been immense. During the Cold War, Pakistan stood with the Western bloc against communism threat and became a key partner in regional security. From 1979 to 1989, Pakistan played the frontline role in resisting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Millions of Afghan refugees were hosted on Pakistani soil, and Pakistan’s geography, intelligence, military cooperation, and political support were central to the eventual Soviet withdrawal. After 9/11, Pakistan again became a major U.S. partner. It was designated a Major Non-NATO Ally in 2004 and paid a heavy price in terrorism, economic losses, social instability, and human sacrifice.
However, Pakistanis also remember that the relationship has rarely been smooth. It has too often been transactional. The history of U.S. sanctions and restrictions on Pakistan shows a pattern that deserves serious review. In 1965, during the India-Pakistan war, the United States imposed an arms embargo on both countries. For Pakistan, which had depended heavily on American military equipment as a treaty ally, this was a deep shock. In 1971, during the East Pakistan crisis and the India-Pakistan war, U.S. military assistance was again restricted or cut, despite Pakistan’s earlier strategic alignment with Washington.
The nuclear issue became the next major source of punitive policy. In 1979, Pakistan faced sanctions under the Symington Amendment because of concerns over uranium enrichment. During the 1980s, presidential waivers were used because Pakistan was needed for the Afghan war. But after the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan’s strategic value suddenly declined in American calculations. In 1990, the Pressler Amendment sanctions were triggered when the U.S. president could no longer certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device. This stopped major military and economic assistance and badly damaged trust. Pakistanis still remember the blocked delivery of F-16 aircraft, for which Pakistan had already paid.
In 1998, after India conducted nuclear tests and Pakistan responded with its own tests to restore strategic balance, Washington imposed sanctions under the Glenn Amendment. These sanctions restricted economic assistance, military sales, credits, and support from international financial institutions. Pakistan’s position was that its tests were not an act of aggression, but a defensive response to India’s nuclearization. Yet Pakistan, rather than receiving understanding for its security compulsions, was punished.
In 1999, after the military takeover in Pakistan, further democracy-related restrictions were imposed. After 9/11, many of these sanctions were waived or lifted because Pakistan was again needed for Afghanistan. This was precisely the problem: sanctions were not removed because Pakistan’s security concerns had been understood; they were removed because American strategic requirements had changed. This reinforced the Pakistani perception that Washington’s friendship was based more on utility than principle.
The pattern continued in later years. In 2011, after several crises including the Abbottabad raid and the Salala incident, relations deteriorated sharply. Military cooperation suffered, reimbursements were delayed, and mistrust deepened. In 2018, the United States suspended most security assistance to Pakistan, accusing it of not doing enough against militant networks. Pakistan rejected this approach, arguing that it had suffered thousands of casualties and enormous economic losses in the war on terror. Coalition Support Funds, which Pakistan regarded as reimbursement for expenses already incurred, became another source of grievance.
More recently, the United States imposed sanctions on Pakistani entities linked to the country’s ballistic missile program. In December 2024, sanctions were announced against the National Development Complex and three associated commercial entities under Executive Order 13382. Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry rejected these measures as unfortunate and biased, stating that Pakistan’s strategic capabilities are meant to defend sovereignty and preserve peace and stability in South Asia. Islamabad also warned that such sanctions accentuate military asymmetries and have dangerous implications for regional stability.
Taken together, the major U.S. sanctions, bans, and restrictions on Pakistan over the last eight decades include the 1965 arms embargo; 1971 military assistance restrictions; 1979 Symington Amendment sanctions; 1990 Pressler Amendment sanctions; 1998 Glenn Amendment nuclear-test sanctions; 1999 democracy-related sanctions after the military takeover; post-2011 reductions and restrictions in defense cooperation; 2018 suspension of most security assistance; repeated export-control and entity-list restrictions linked to missile and strategic programs; and the 2024 sanctions on missile-related entities. This history cannot be ignored if both countries want a sincere reset.
At the same time, Pakistan has watched the U.S. tilt toward India with growing concern. Washington has deepened defense, nuclear, technological, and strategic cooperation with New Delhi. The U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver for India, the designation of India as a Major Defense Partner, and expanding defense trade all demonstrate the strategic priority Washington has attached to India. The stated American logic may be to strengthen India as a counterweight to China. But Pakistan’s concern is different: India has often used its growing international confidence not against China, but against Pakistan and smaller neighbors.
This imbalance has created strategic instability in South Asia. India’s conventional military buildup, access to advanced technologies, and diplomatic encouragement have hardened its regional posture. Pakistan believes that any policy strengthening India without recognizing Pakistan’s security concerns encourages arrogance, not restraint. India has neither the clear intention nor the full capacity to contain China in the manner imagined by some American strategists. Its immediate strategic focus has historically remained Pakistan, Kashmir, and regional dominance. Therefore, policies designed in Washington for one purpose can produce dangerous consequences in South Asia.
The Afghanistan experience also offers a major lesson. As long as Pakistan’s role was respected and its ground realities were understood, American interests in the region were better protected. When Pakistan’s concerns were ignored and U.S. policy became overly dependent on other assumptions, the outcome was the humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. Pakistan did not create that failure; rather, it had long warned that Afghanistan required a political settlement, not a purely military solution. The debacle should encourage Washington to listen more seriously to Pakistan’s regional understanding.
There are now signs of a better moment. Since President Donald Trump returned to office in 2025, he has repeatedly spoken positively about Pakistan and its leadership. Pakistan has reciprocated goodwill, including by appreciating his role in peace efforts and nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize. Pakistan has also supported de-escalation efforts between Iran and the United States and continues to seek stability in a turbulent region. This creates an opportunity to revive the traditional friendship between two old allies.
But revival must not mean returning to old transactional habits. A modern U.S.-Pakistan relationship should rest on five pillars.
First, the United States should review and remove sanctions, bans, and restrictions that unfairly target Pakistan’s legitimate security and technological development. Pakistan’s strategic capability is defensive and rooted in the regional imbalance created by India’s military expansion. Punishing Pakistan while facilitating advanced cooperation with India cannot produce stability.
Second, both countries should pursue a serious trade and investment framework, ideally moving toward preferential market access and eventually a free-trade arrangement. Pakistan needs export growth, industrial modernization, and access to American markets. The United States can benefit from Pakistan’s young population, strategic location, IT talent, minerals, agriculture, textiles, and emerging technology sectors.
Third, technology transfer must become a central part of the partnership. Pakistan does not seek dependency; it seeks capacity. Cooperation in clean energy, agriculture technology, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, health sciences, climate resilience, and higher education can create long-term goodwill.
Fourth, people-to-people relations must be strengthened. Pakistani students, researchers, entrepreneurs, doctors, engineers, and IT professionals should have easier access to American universities, training institutions, and job markets. A more relaxed visa regime would do more for friendship than any diplomatic slogan.
Fifth, Washington should adopt a balanced South Asia policy. Supporting India at the cost of Pakistan has not brought peace. A fair policy would recognize Pakistan’s sacrifices, support resolution of disputes through dialogue, and discourage unilateralism, extremism, and militarization in the region.
Pakistan and the United States do not need a relationship based on nostalgia alone. They need a mature partnership based on mutual respect, long-term interests, and recognition of each other’s legitimate concerns. Pakistan has been a sincere ally in difficult times. It has protected American interests, supported regional stability, and paid a heavy price for decisions taken in partnership with Washington. Now it deserves trust, not suspicion; cooperation, not coercion; access, not restrictions.
The 250th anniversary of the United States is not only a celebration of American history. It can also become a moment of renewal in U.S.-Pakistan relations. If Washington truly believes in partnership rooted in sovereignty, reciprocity, and shared prosperity, then Pakistan is ready. The opportunity is clear: two old allies can move beyond mistrust and build a future based on trade, technology, education, peace, and people-to-people friendship. The past was complicated, but the future can still be constructive, balanced, and hopeful.
