US President Donald Trump’s enthusiastic response to the new Makkah Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan may appear surprising.
The agreement creates a regional security arrangement in which an armed attack against one of the three countries is to be regarded as an attack against all three. The pact was signed in Makkah on August 7, 2026, and the three governments describe it as defensive rather than directed against a particular country.
Yet Trump has publicly welcomed the agreement as a major step toward stronger regional security cooperation.
That raises a much bigger geopolitical question: Why would a US president celebrate an alliance that could eventually reduce the Middle East’s dependence on America’s security umbrella?
The answer lies in the changing architecture of Middle Eastern power.
Trump may actually see the pact as an opportunity rather than a threat. A stronger Saudi Arabia, a more strategically active Türkiye and a security-capable Pakistan could potentially carry more of the regional defense burden while Washington concentrates on its own priorities. At the same time, the agreement could strengthen US leverage by giving Washington additional regional partners capable of containing instability without requiring permanent American military intervention.
For Iran, however, the equation is much more complicated.
The Makkah pact does not formally name Iran as an enemy. Pakistan has explicitly said that the agreement is defensive and “not directed against any country.” But Tehran cannot ignore the strategic consequences of three influential Muslim-majority powers coordinating their defense policies at a moment when the region is already experiencing an unprecedented security crisis.
The result is a potentially historic shift: the Middle East may be moving from a US-dominated security system toward a more complicated system of regional power blocs.
The Makkah Pact Changes the Security Equation
The most important feature of the agreement is its collective-defense principle.
Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan have agreed that an armed attack against one member will be treated as an attack against all. The agreement also calls for enhanced defense cooperation and collective deterrence.
This is strategically significant because the three countries bring very different capabilities.
Saudi Arabia contributes financial power, advanced military procurement, strategic geography and control over critical energy infrastructure.
Türkiye brings one of the region’s largest and most experienced military establishments, a NATO membership, a substantial defense industry and geographic access to both Europe and the Middle East.
Pakistan contributes a large standing military, nuclear deterrence and extensive experience in conventional and asymmetric security environments.
Individually, each country has limitations. Collectively, they represent a much more substantial strategic calculation.
The pact therefore matters less because it immediately creates a NATO-style military command and more because it establishes the political principle of shared strategic responsibility.
That distinction is crucial.
The agreement does not automatically mean that Turkish or Pakistani forces would enter every conflict involving Saudi Arabia. Nor does it establish a fully integrated military command comparable to NATO. Its effectiveness will depend on implementation, military planning, intelligence sharing, logistics, political decisions and the interpretation of what constitutes an armed attack.
But even as a framework, it changes calculations across the region.
Why Trump May Actually Benefit From a Stronger Regional Alliance
Trump’s support becomes easier to understand when viewed through his long-standing demand that US allies contribute more to their own defense.
For Washington, the ideal outcome is not necessarily to maintain an enormous American security footprint forever. It is to have powerful partners capable of protecting themselves and their surrounding regions while the United States retains strategic influence.
The Makkah pact fits that philosophy surprisingly well.
If Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan develop stronger mechanisms for regional deterrence, Washington could potentially reduce some of the pressure on US forces without abandoning its strategic interests.
This is particularly relevant after the enormous disruption caused by the US-Iran conflict and the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz.
The US remains a formidable military power, but the conflict has demonstrated how expensive and unpredictable direct military involvement in the Middle East can become.
Trump therefore has a powerful incentive to tell regional partners: build your own security capacity.
The Makkah agreement is precisely the kind of development that can be presented as evidence that they are doing so.
Trump Is Not Necessarily Celebrating the Decline of US Power
There is another interpretation.
Trump’s praise does not necessarily mean Washington wants to abandon the Middle East.
Rather, the United States could be attempting to transform its role from primary security provider to strategic power broker.
That is a very different model.
Instead of guaranteeing every aspect of Gulf security directly, Washington could maintain its bases, intelligence networks, arms sales, naval presence and diplomatic influence while encouraging regional states to create their own security mechanisms.
Such an arrangement could actually preserve American influence at lower political and military cost.
The United States would remain indispensable—but no longer necessarily responsible for doing everything.
This is one reason Trump’s reaction should not automatically be interpreted as a US strategic defeat.
Iran Faces a New Strategic Problem
For Iran, however, the emergence of a Saudi-Türkiye-Pakistan defense framework creates a new layer of uncertainty.
Iran has historically relied on a combination of its own military capabilities, missile forces, geographic depth and regional partnerships to offset the superior conventional capabilities of the United States and its regional allies.
The Makkah pact potentially complicates that strategy.
Saudi Arabia is Iran’s most important Arab Gulf rival. Türkiye has frequently maintained an independent foreign policy toward Tehran, including diplomatic engagement and economic relations. Pakistan has traditionally attempted to balance its relationships with Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Bringing all three into a formal defense framework creates a new strategic triangle.
But there is an important limitation: the pact does not automatically transform Türkiye or Pakistan into anti-Iran military partners.
In fact, Pakistan has simultaneously emphasized diplomacy and regional de-escalation. Its foreign ministry has said Islamabad is working to bring the parties in the Gulf crisis back to negotiations, while Pakistani officials have continued communicating with both Saudi and Iranian officials.
Türkiye has similarly maintained channels with Tehran. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called on Trump on August 17 to pursue negotiations with Iran and offered Turkish support for diplomacy.
This makes the pact more complicated than a simple “anti-Iran alliance.”
It is better understood as a regional insurance mechanism.
The Iran Question: Enemy or Unintended Target?
One of the most important geopolitical questions is whether Iran eventually becomes the de facto target of the pact despite not being named in it.
The answer is not predetermined.
Saudi Arabia has strong reasons to protect itself against missile, drone and other forms of regional attack. Türkiye wants to prevent instability from spreading across its borders. Pakistan wants strategic depth and stronger relations with Saudi Arabia without becoming trapped in another regional war.
All three therefore have reasons to support collective deterrence.
But they also have reasons to avoid a direct confrontation with Iran.
That creates a strategic paradox.
The stronger the pact becomes, the more Iran may perceive it as threatening—even if its members insist that it is defensive.
And the more Iran perceives a threat, the more Tehran could seek to strengthen its own military alliances and asymmetric capabilities.
That could produce a regional security dilemma in which defensive alliances create offensive perceptions.
Saudi Arabia Is the Biggest Immediate Winner
Saudi Arabia may have the most to gain.
Riyadh has spent years investing heavily in advanced military equipment, air defense, missiles, drones, domestic defense production and strategic partnerships.
But Saudi Arabia’s central vulnerability remains the possibility that sophisticated military hardware does not automatically guarantee political protection.
The experience of regional attacks has reinforced the importance of independent deterrence.
The Makkah agreement gives Riyadh another layer.
Instead of depending entirely on Washington, Saudi Arabia can potentially draw upon Turkish military capabilities and Pakistan’s strategic relationship with the kingdom.
This does not replace the United States overnight.
But it gives Saudi Arabia more diplomatic options and potentially more strategic autonomy.
That is a major development for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s broader ambition to position Saudi Arabia as an independent center of global power.
Pakistan Gains Strategic Weight
Pakistan is another major beneficiary.
For Islamabad, the agreement elevates Pakistan from being primarily a South Asian military power to becoming an increasingly important participant in Middle Eastern security architecture.
Pakistan has long maintained defense ties with Saudi Arabia, and the new agreement expands the framework to include Türkiye.
Islamabad can now potentially position itself as both a security partner and diplomatic intermediary.
That dual role is important.
Pakistan’s foreign ministry has emphasized that the Makkah pact is defensive while simultaneously stating that Islamabad remains engaged in efforts to resolve the Gulf and Middle East crisis through dialogue.
This gives Pakistan an unusual strategic position:
security partner to Saudi Arabia, strategic partner to Türkiye and diplomatic channel to Iran.
If Islamabad can maintain all three relationships, its geopolitical importance could increase significantly.
Türkiye Could Become the Bridge Between Europe and the Middle East
Türkiye’s role may be even more consequential.
Ankara already sits at the intersection of NATO, Europe, the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Middle East.
Its defense industry has also become increasingly important, particularly in drones, missiles, electronic warfare and other military technologies.
The Makkah pact potentially extends Turkish strategic influence southward.
Türkiye can now deepen defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan while retaining diplomatic channels with Iran.
That creates a potentially unique position.
Türkiye does not have to choose immediately between being a NATO power and being a regional Muslim power. It can attempt to operate in both systems.
That could make Ankara one of the most influential players in the emerging Middle Eastern security order.
What Happens to the US Security Umbrella?
This is perhaps the most important long-term question.
The US has traditionally been the ultimate external security guarantor for many Gulf states.
The Makkah agreement does not eliminate that reality.
But it introduces a competing principle:
regional states can build their own collective security arrangements.
That could eventually produce a two-layer security system.
The first layer would consist of regional alliances involving Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Pakistan and potentially additional states.
The second would remain the American security architecture involving US military bases, naval forces, intelligence cooperation, missile defense, arms transfers and strategic diplomacy.
The two systems could coexist.
In fact, they may become mutually reinforcing.
But there is also a possibility that regional governments increasingly decide that they need several security partners rather than one dominant protector.
That would represent a major change in Middle Eastern geopolitics.
Could Egypt Join Later?
The possibility of additional countries joining or cooperating with the emerging framework deserves attention.
Egypt is strategically important because of its military size, control of the Suez Canal and diplomatic influence across the Arab world.
However, Cairo’s strategic calculations are more complicated.
Its peace relationship with Israel, relations with Washington, economic pressures and traditional leadership role in Arab politics make membership in a new defense bloc politically sensitive.
The question is therefore not simply whether Egypt supports greater regional security cooperation.
It is whether Cairo would be willing to participate in a structure that could eventually acquire an independent strategic identity.
That decision could significantly affect the future balance of power.
What About the Gulf States?
The United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman will also be watching closely.
They have different relationships with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Türkiye and the United States.
A Saudi-Türkiye-Pakistan security framework could therefore produce two opposite reactions.
Some Gulf states may see it as useful additional insurance.
Others may worry that a large regional military bloc could increase polarization.
The Gulf monarchies have learned that their interests cannot always be perfectly aligned.
Some want closer American protection.
Some want stronger ties with China.
Some have improved relations with Iran.
Some maintain deep economic relationships with Türkiye.
This means the Middle East is unlikely to develop a single unified military bloc.
Instead, it is becoming a multi-alignment system.
Israel Faces a New Strategic Environment
Israel is another critical piece of the puzzle.
For years, one of the central American strategies in the region was to encourage closer Arab-Israeli security cooperation, particularly through the Abraham Accords.
But the regional wars have complicated that strategy.
Arab governments increasingly have to balance relations with Washington and Israel against domestic public opinion, the Palestinian issue and concerns about regional escalation.
A stronger Saudi-Türkiye-Pakistan defense framework does not necessarily mean the pact is anti-Israel.
Its official language is defensive and does not name Israel or Iran as an adversary.
Nevertheless, the emergence of an independent Muslim-majority security framework could make it harder for Israel to remain the central military partner around which regional security is organized.
That is an important geopolitical consequence.
The Gaza War Still Shapes the New Middle East
No analysis of the Makkah pact can ignore Gaza.
The Palestinian issue continues to influence the strategic calculations of Arab and Muslim-majority governments.
Saudi Arabia has repeatedly sought to balance its relationship with Washington against its position on Palestinian statehood.
Türkiye has adopted a highly critical stance toward Israeli military policy.
Pakistan has consistently emphasized Palestinian self-determination and a two-state solution.
These overlapping political positions help explain why a regional security framework involving these countries carries symbolic significance beyond military cooperation.
The pact is therefore about more than missiles, troops and intelligence.
It is also about who defines the political agenda of the Muslim-majority world.
China and Russia Are Also Watching
The Makkah agreement could have consequences beyond Washington, Tehran and the Gulf.
China has expanded its economic and diplomatic footprint across the Middle East, including its role in facilitating Saudi-Iranian diplomatic rapprochement.
Beijing is unlikely to welcome a regional security architecture that becomes explicitly aligned with Washington.
But China may also benefit from greater regional stability because its economic interests depend heavily on Gulf energy supplies and trade routes.
Russia faces a different calculation.
Moscow has strong relationships with Iran and maintains growing ties with Türkiye and Gulf states. A more autonomous regional security system could weaken Washington’s exclusive influence, potentially creating additional diplomatic opportunities for Russia.
However, neither China nor Russia automatically becomes a strategic beneficiary if regional competition intensifies.
A fragmented Middle East could create economic and security risks for both powers.
The Strait of Hormuz Makes the Pact Even More Important
The crisis around the Strait of Hormuz has transformed the strategic environment.
The waterway is essential to global energy markets, and disruptions immediately affect oil prices, shipping costs, inflation and global economic stability.
The current US-Iran confrontation has already demonstrated how quickly a regional conflict can become a global economic problem.
The breakdown of the June US-Iran agreement and the continuing dispute over the Strait have further increased uncertainty.
That makes regional defense cooperation more attractive to Saudi Arabia.
For Riyadh, the threat is not theoretical.
Saudi infrastructure, energy facilities, shipping routes and economic transformation plans all depend on regional stability.
The Makkah pact therefore has a direct economic dimension.
Security is becoming a prerequisite for Saudi Arabia’s economic transformation.
Why Iran May Be More Concerned About the Political Message Than the Military Pact
Iran’s immediate military calculation may not be the most important issue.
The deeper concern could be political.
The pact demonstrates that major Muslim-majority states can construct a security framework without Iran and without making the United States its formal guarantor.
That could challenge Tehran’s longstanding claim to be one of the central independent powers of the Islamic world.
At the same time, Iran can point to its own military capabilities and regional influence.
The result is a competition between different models of regional leadership.
Saudi Arabia offers economic power and religious significance.
Türkiye offers military-industrial and geopolitical reach.
Pakistan offers military capability and strategic depth.
Iran offers missiles, asymmetric warfare capabilities, geographic depth and a network of regional partners.
This is no longer simply a Saudi-Iran rivalry.
It is becoming a competition among several overlapping centers of power.
Is the Makkah Pact a “Muslim NATO”?
The comparison is politically attractive but strategically premature.
The collective-defense clause resembles NATO’s core principle, but institutional differences are enormous.
The Makkah agreement does not yet possess NATO’s decades-old command structure, integrated military planning system, standardized force architecture or institutional depth.
Calling it a “Muslim NATO” therefore risks exaggerating its current capabilities.
But the comparison does reveal the pact’s ambition.
The central idea is collective deterrence.
And deterrence becomes credible when potential adversaries believe that attacking one member could trigger a coordinated response from several others.
The real test will therefore not be the signing ceremony.
The real test will come during the next serious regional crisis.
Could the Pact Actually Reduce US Influence?
Yes—but probably not immediately.
The agreement could reduce US influence if it develops into an autonomous regional military organization with its own command, intelligence, logistics and defense-industrial capabilities.
But it could also strengthen American influence if Washington becomes the technology, intelligence and diplomatic backbone behind regional partners.
This is why Trump’s enthusiastic reaction is strategically revealing.
He may not view regional autonomy as America’s defeat.
He may see it as burden-sharing.
That interpretation is consistent with Trump’s broader approach to alliances: allies should become stronger, spend more and assume greater responsibility.
The Makkah agreement therefore may be less of an American withdrawal than an experiment in outsourcing parts of regional security.
The Biggest Risk: A New Arms Race
There is also a darker possibility.
If Iran perceives the Makkah pact as a hostile coalition, Tehran could increase missile production, drone development and military cooperation with its partners.
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states could respond with additional weapons purchases.
Türkiye could expand its defense production.
Pakistan could increase military cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye.
Israel could strengthen its own regional military posture.
The result could be a new Middle Eastern arms race.
This would create a classic security dilemma: each side claims it is strengthening defense, while the opposing side sees the same moves as preparations for attack.
That is why the pact’s defensive language and diplomatic channels with Iran are strategically important.
The Paradox: Trump May Be Celebrating a Pact That Could Reduce American Dominance
The apparent contradiction is now easier to understand.
Trump can be happy about the Makkah pact for at least five reasons.
First, it encourages regional allies to assume greater responsibility for their own security.
Second, it potentially reduces the burden on US forces.
Third, it strengthens Saudi Arabia, one of Washington’s most important regional partners.
Fourth, it gives the United States additional leverage in dealing with Iran.
Fifth, it creates a new network of regional powers that can potentially help contain crises without requiring direct American intervention every time.
In other words, Trump may not be celebrating the end of the American security umbrella.
He may be celebrating the emergence of regional pillars underneath it.
But Iran Is Not Necessarily the Loser
It would be equally wrong to assume that Iran has already lost.
Tehran still possesses major strategic advantages.
Its geography gives it enormous influence over the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.
Its missile and drone capabilities remain central to its deterrence strategy.
Its relationships with regional non-state actors provide strategic depth.
And importantly, Türkiye and Pakistan are not automatically US-aligned against Iran.
Both have strong incentives to maintain communication with Tehran.
Pakistan’s continued diplomatic engagement with Iran is particularly important. Pakistani officials have publicly discussed the Makkah agreement with Iranian officials while simultaneously pursuing negotiations over the wider Gulf crisis.
That means Tehran still has diplomatic space.
The Iranian strategy will likely depend on preventing the new pact from evolving into a unified anti-Iran coalition.
The Future Middle East May Be Defined by Multi-Alignment
The biggest lesson from the Makkah pact is that the Middle East is becoming less predictable.
The old model was comparatively simple:
United States and partners versus Iran and its allies.
The emerging model is much more complicated:
Saudi Arabia seeks strategic autonomy while retaining US ties.
Türkiye remains a NATO member while expanding regional independence.
Pakistan strengthens Gulf defense relationships while maintaining dialogue with Iran.
Iran seeks to resist US pressure while preserving relations with neighboring states.
Gulf countries maintain US security ties while diversifying toward China, Türkiye and other powers.
This is not a traditional alliance system.
It is multi-alignment.
Countries are increasingly refusing to place all their strategic interests in one basket.
What the Makkah Pact Means for Trump
For Trump, the agreement provides an opportunity to claim that his approach is working.
He can argue that regional partners are becoming stronger and more responsible for their own defense.
But there is a strategic contradiction Washington must manage.
If regional states become genuinely autonomous, American influence could eventually decline.
If Washington tries too aggressively to control the new architecture, regional governments may conclude that the United States still wants to dominate the security system.
The smartest American strategy would therefore be to remain deeply engaged without appearing to block regional autonomy.
That balance will be difficult.
What It Means for Saudi Arabia
For Riyadh, the pact is fundamentally about strategic insurance.
Saudi Arabia does not have to abandon Washington.
It does not have to become anti-Iran.
It does not have to reject Israel.
It does not have to choose China over America.
Instead, the kingdom can build multiple layers of strategic protection.
That gives Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman more room to maneuver.
Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical ambition is increasingly clear: it wants to become a central power in its own right rather than merely a protected US ally.
The Makkah pact is consistent with that ambition.
What It Means for Pakistan
For Pakistan, the agreement could represent one of the country’s most consequential geopolitical developments in years.
Islamabad gains stronger institutionalized defense ties with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye while potentially expanding its diplomatic influence across the Middle East.
But Pakistan faces a delicate challenge.
It must prevent the pact from turning into an anti-Iran military alliance.
That would jeopardize Pakistan’s relationship with its western neighbor and could undermine Islamabad’s claim to be a mediator.
The current Pakistani approach—strengthening defense cooperation while emphasizing diplomacy—may therefore be the most sustainable strategy.
What It Means for Türkiye
For Türkiye, the pact could be another step toward becoming a central pole of regional power.
Ankara has increasingly sought strategic autonomy from traditional Western structures while remaining inside NATO.
The Makkah agreement provides another platform through which Türkiye can project influence into the Gulf and South Asia.
If defense cooperation expands into joint exercises, intelligence sharing, military technology and defense production, Türkiye’s regional influence could increase substantially.
What It Means for Iran
For Iran, the immediate task is not necessarily to confront the pact militarily.
It is to prevent the three countries from becoming a unified strategic bloc against Tehran.
Iran could therefore prioritize diplomacy with Pakistan and Türkiye while attempting to reduce tensions with Saudi Arabia.
That would explain why the pact creates an unusual strategic situation.
The agreement could simultaneously increase Iran’s security concerns and create incentives for Tehran to pursue diplomacy more seriously.
That is one of the paradoxes of deterrence.
Sometimes military balancing creates pressure for negotiation rather than war.
The Real Question Is What Comes Next
The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement is important—but its future depends on implementation.
Several questions will determine whether it becomes a historic security organization or remains a symbolic political agreement.
Will the three countries establish permanent military coordination?
Will they conduct joint exercises?
Will they create intelligence-sharing mechanisms?
Will they coordinate air and missile defense?
Will they develop joint defense industries?
Will other Muslim-majority states join?
Will the pact remain neutral toward Iran?
Will Washington support it as burden-sharing or eventually see it as competition?
And most importantly:
What happens when the next major military crisis hits the region?
Those answers will determine whether the Makkah pact becomes a new pillar of Middle Eastern security.
Trump May Be Happier Because the Pact Serves His Strategy
The apparent mystery of Trump’s reaction disappears when the Makkah agreement is viewed through the wider transformation of Middle Eastern geopolitics.
Trump is not necessarily celebrating because the United States has lost influence.
He may be celebrating because Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan are demonstrating exactly the kind of regional burden-sharing Washington has increasingly demanded.
Iran, meanwhile, faces a more complicated strategic environment. The pact does not formally target Tehran, and both Pakistan and Türkiye continue to maintain diplomatic channels with Iran. But the emergence of a collective-defense framework linking Saudi Arabia with two major regional powers inevitably changes Tehran’s calculations.
The Makkah agreement therefore should not yet be described as a “Muslim NATO,” nor should it be dismissed as merely symbolic.
It represents something more significant: the beginning of a possible transition from an American-centered Middle Eastern security system toward a multi-layered regional order in which Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan increasingly take responsibility for their own strategic environment.
Trump’s happiness may therefore have less to do with the disappearance of America’s role and more to do with the possibility that Washington can remain powerful while making its partners carry more of the security burden.
For Iran, the challenge is equally clear: the region is no longer being organized solely by Washington, Tehran or any single power.
The next Middle Eastern order will be shaped by competing regional centers—and the Makkah pact may be one of the first major institutions of that new era.
Trump welcomes the pact because it can shift more regional security responsibility onto US partners. Saudi Arabia welcomes it because it gains strategic insurance. Türkiye welcomes it because it expands its regional influence. Pakistan welcomes it because it gains strategic weight and diplomatic leverage. Iran is concerned because three major Muslim powers have created a collective-defense framework that could become a powerful regional deterrent—even though the pact officially does not target Tehran.
The real geopolitical battle has therefore moved beyond the question of “Who protects the Middle East?”
The new question is:
“Who will shape the Middle East when no single power can control its security architecture alone?”
And that is why the Makkah pact could prove far more important than the signing ceremony itself.
