HomeLatestIs Beijing Playing the Victim? Inside China’s Latest Media Attack on Japan

Is Beijing Playing the Victim? Inside China’s Latest Media Attack on Japan

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When a Fishing Dispute Becomes a Political Weapon

A recent Global Times article titled “Japan’s jitters over Chinese fishing vessels reveal a guilty conscience” presents the latest China-Japan maritime tensions through a familiar political lens: China as the relatively calm actor and Japan as the nervous, suspicious and ultimately responsible party. The article was published on August 19, 2026, amid continuing maritime tensions between Beijing and Tokyo.

The underlying issue is real. Chinese fishing and government vessels operate around disputed and strategically sensitive waters, while Japan monitors and responds to activity around the Senkaku Islands, which China calls the Diaoyu Islands. Japan itself publishes regular records of Chinese Coast Guard and other vessel activity in the surrounding waters.

Turning Japanese Monitoring Into Evidence of Guilt

The article’s central rhetorical move is contained in its headline: “Japan’s jitters … reveal a guilty conscience.”

That is not a neutral description.

“Jitters” is an emotional characterisation. “Guilty conscience” is an allegation about motive.

Neither automatically follows from the observable fact that Japan is monitoring Chinese fishing vessels.

Japan has legitimate reasons to monitor maritime activity around the Senkaku Islands because the area is disputed and has experienced repeated confrontations involving Chinese government vessels and Japanese fishing boats.

Japan’s Foreign Ministry states that Chinese Coast Guard and other vessels have repeatedly entered the contiguous zone around the islands and that Japan maintains monitoring and responses to such activity.

That does not prove every Japanese interpretation is correct.

But it does mean that Japanese surveillance cannot logically be presented as proof that Japan has a “guilty conscience.”

This is the first major propaganda technique in the article: converting an observable security response into psychological evidence against the responding country.

The Bigger Omission: China’s Own Maritime Activity

A proper fact-check must ask what the article leaves outside the frame.

Japan’s concerns are not based exclusively on ordinary Chinese fishing boats.

Japan’s official documentation specifically tracks Chinese Coast Guard and other Chinese vessels around the Senkaku Islands. Tokyo says Chinese government vessels have repeatedly entered the surrounding contiguous zone, and it maintains that some Chinese activities violate Japanese territorial waters.

Japan also reported in June that Chinese Coast Guard vessels had been operating intermittently within Japan’s exclusive economic zone south of Yonaguni Island, near Taiwan, while making unilateral claims over those waters.

Therefore, a media narrative focusing narrowly on Chinese fishing boats and Japanese anxiety can obscure the broader strategic environment.

The dispute is not simply:

Chinese fishermen versus nervous Japan.

It involves fishing activity, coast guard deployments, competing maritime claims, military signalling and the wider strategic competition between Beijing and Tokyo.

That distinction is crucial.

The “Fishing Boat” Narrative Can Be Politically Convenient

Fishing vessels are particularly useful in geopolitical messaging because they appear civilian.

A photograph of a fishing boat creates a very different emotional impression from a photograph of a Coast Guard cutter.

This allows political narratives to emphasise the vulnerability of fishermen while placing the responding state in the role of aggressor.

But maritime disputes are rarely that simple.

China has a large fishing fleet operating throughout the region, and Chinese government vessels have historically accompanied or interacted with fishing vessels around disputed waters.

Japan has documented instances in which Chinese government vessels were present alongside Chinese fishing boats in waters around the Senkakus.

That does not mean every Chinese fishing vessel is acting under government direction.

It does mean that the political context cannot be reduced to innocent fishermen being harassed by Japan.

Fact Check: Does Japan Have No Reason to Monitor Chinese Fishing Activity?

The available evidence contradicts that interpretation.

Japan’s Fisheries Agency says it monitors foreign fishing vessels to determine whether they comply with applicable fishing conditions and regulations. It also reports enforcement activity involving foreign vessels in Japan’s EEZ.

Japan has separately documented problems involving Chinese fishing vessels around the Yamato Bank in the Sea of Japan, including alleged illegal fishing. Its official records show that Japanese authorities have repeatedly warned Chinese vessels to leave certain areas.

Japan is therefore not inventing the concept of monitoring Chinese fishing activity.

There are documented fisheries-enforcement issues.

The legitimate debate is how Japan interprets and responds to those activities, not whether the underlying maritime activity exists.

The Global Times article appears to employ what can be described as moral reversal.

Instead of asking:

Why are Chinese vessels operating in disputed or sensitive waters?

the narrative asks:

Why is Japan so nervous about Chinese vessels?

That subtle change completely alters the reader’s perspective.

The original maritime action disappears into the background.

The reaction becomes the headline.

This is an effective propaganda technique because it moves the audience’s attention away from the disputed behaviour itself and toward the behaviour of the opposing government.

The same method appears repeatedly in geopolitical messaging:

Action → reaction → blame the reaction.

The country taking the initial action can then portray itself as the victim of the response.

“Japan Is Afraid of China”

Another recurring theme is psychological.

The Global Times frequently frames Japanese security concerns as evidence that Japan is frightened of China’s rise rather than as a response to concrete changes in the regional security environment.

That interpretation is attractive because it reinforces Beijing’s preferred image of China as an increasingly powerful state whose opponents are becoming nervous.

But there is a major analytical weakness.

A country can be concerned about another country’s military or maritime expansion without being irrationally “afraid.”

Japan has legitimate security interests around its southwestern islands, the East China Sea and Taiwan.

The Japanese government has consequently increased attention to its southwestern defence posture.

Calling that simply “jitters” removes the strategic context.

The Disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Question Cannot Be Ignored

The territorial dispute itself is central.

Japan administers the Senkaku Islands, while China claims them as Diaoyu.

Because sovereignty is disputed, both governments interpret maritime activity around the islands differently.

China views Japanese actions through the prism of its sovereignty claims.

Japan views Chinese Coast Guard activity as challenges to the status quo.

Neither government’s narrative should simply be accepted without scrutiny.

But a fact-check article must also recognise that disputed sovereignty does not automatically make every action by either side legitimate.

That is precisely what the Global Times framing tends to blur.

Instead of separating:

  • territorial claims,
  • fishing rights,
  • EEZ jurisdiction,
  • Coast Guard operations,
  • territorial-water incidents and
  • military signalling,

the article packages the dispute into a broader political story about Japanese insecurity.

That makes the story easier to consume — but less analytically precise.

China’s Own Official Narrative Reveals the Larger Strategy

The Global Times is not an independent newspaper operating outside China’s political information ecosystem.

Its own corporate description says the newspaper is sponsored by People’s Daily and positions itself as an international media platform explaining China to global audiences.

The South China Morning Post likewise describes Global Times as a Beijing-based state-owned tabloid operating under the auspices of the Communist Party’s People’s Daily and notes its nationalist and hawkish approach to international issues.

This does not mean every factual statement published by Global Times is false.

That would itself be poor fact-checking.

It means the outlet’s institutional position matters when evaluating framing, especially on sensitive issues involving China’s territorial claims, Japan, Taiwan and national security.

The correct approach is therefore:

verify the facts independently, then examine how those facts are assembled into a political narrative.

What the Article Gets Right

A fair analysis should also acknowledge what is legitimate in the Global Times argument.

Japan and China do have serious maritime tensions.

Japanese monitoring of Chinese vessels can increase diplomatic friction.

Japan’s political rhetoric toward China has hardened.

The East China Sea remains a strategically sensitive region.

And fishing communities can become victims of geopolitical competition even when they are not responsible for it.

These are legitimate points.

The problem emerges when legitimate observations are combined with unverified psychological conclusions such as “guilty conscience” and presented as though they were established facts.

What the Article Leaves Out

The missing context is more revealing.

Japan’s concerns are connected not only to fishing vessels but also to repeated Chinese government-vessel activity.

Japan’s Foreign Ministry maintains a dedicated database documenting trends involving Chinese Coast Guard and other vessels around the Senkaku Islands.

Japan’s defence authorities also regularly publish information concerning Chinese naval activity around Japan. In August 2026, Japan’s Joint Staff listed recent releases concerning Chinese naval activity around Japanese waters.

Meanwhile, China and Japan have already experienced competing accounts of maritime confrontations. Reuters reported in July that the two governments gave conflicting versions of an incident near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, with China saying a Japanese fishing boat had entered Chinese territorial waters and Japan saying Chinese Coast Guard vessels had confronted a Japanese fishing boat.

This is exactly why readers should be cautious when one side’s media narrative presents a disputed incident as if the motivation and responsibility are already settled.

From Dispute to Victimhood

The article can be understood through a broader Chinese media framing pattern:

China is presented as reactive.

Japan is presented as provocative.

Chinese activity is normalised.

Japanese responses are portrayed as aggressive or hysterical.

China’s strategic objectives are minimised.

Japan’s security concerns are personalised.

This is not necessarily a fabrication of individual facts.

It is a selection-and-framing strategy.

And framing can be just as important as factual accuracy because readers usually remember the story’s central emotional message rather than its individual details.

Why This Matters Beyond China and Japan

This narrative has implications for the wider Indo-Pacific.

Japan is a major US ally and a key security actor in the region. China increasingly challenges the existing regional security architecture.

Consequently, disputes around fishing vessels, Coast Guard patrols and maritime boundaries are not isolated incidents.

They contribute to a broader contest over who defines the rules of the East China Sea.

If Chinese state-linked media consistently portrays Japanese monitoring as irrational while treating China’s own maritime presence as routine, it helps normalise China’s expanding operational footprint.

This is where media framing becomes strategically important.

The story is no longer simply about fishermen.

It becomes part of the larger information contest over the regional status quo.

Is Japan Completely Innocent?

No — and that is an important part of a credible fact check.

Japan has its own national interests, strategic messaging and territorial claims.

Japanese officials naturally present China’s actions in ways that support Tokyo’s position.

Japanese media can also exaggerate security threats.

Therefore, the answer should not be “believe Japan instead of China.”

The correct answer is:

Do not automatically accept either government’s narrative.

Check vessel locations.

Check whether the vessel was inside territorial waters, the contiguous zone or an EEZ.

Check whether it was a government vessel or a fishing vessel.

Check what international maritime law says about the relevant activity.

Check what happened before and after the confrontation.

And compare competing government statements.

That is genuine fact checking.

Who Is Changing the Status Quo?

This is the question the Global Times article does not sufficiently confront.

Instead of asking whether Japan is “jittery,” analysts should ask:

Is China’s maritime presence around disputed areas increasing, decreasing or remaining stable?

Japan’s official records indicate continuing Chinese Coast Guard activity around the Senkakus.

Recent reporting has also described Chinese Coast Guard activity in waters south of Yonaguni.

These developments deserve independent scrutiny.

If China’s operational presence is expanding, then Japanese monitoring cannot simply be dismissed as irrational fear.

Conversely, if Japan’s responses are becoming disproportionately aggressive, that should also be documented.

The evidence should decide.

The Facts Are Real, But the Frame Is Political

The evidence confirms that Japan monitors Chinese fishing and government vessels and that China-Japan maritime tensions around disputed waters are genuine. Japan’s own records document continuing Chinese Coast Guard activity around the Senkaku Islands, while other evidence confirms that fishing-related enforcement disputes also exist.

However, the leap from “Japan is monitoring Chinese vessels” to “Japan has a guilty conscience” is not a factual conclusion. It is an interpretation.

That is the central propaganda problem.

The article takes a complex maritime dispute and turns it into a psychological morality play:

China is calm. Japan is nervous. China is the victim. Japan is the aggressor.

The reality is considerably more complicated.

China and Japan are competing over maritime space, sovereignty, fisheries, security and regional influence. Chinese Coast Guard activity, Japanese monitoring, fishing operations and military signalling are all pieces of the same strategic puzzle.

Do not confuse Global Times’ interpretation of the dispute with independently established facts. The article’s most powerful claims are not necessarily its factual claims — they are its assumptions about who is guilty, who is afraid and who is responsible.

And that is precisely where readers should look most carefully when examining Chinese state-linked media narratives.

YOSHIKAWA Toru
YOSHIKAWA Toruhttps://w-rdb.waseda.jp/html/100003861_en.html#contents
Professor Toru Yoshikawa of Waseda University,Japan. Faculty of Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences

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