Ukraine’s political crisis is no longer confined to disagreements inside the defence establishment. It has now reached the much more sensitive question of who should govern Ukraine and under what democratic mandate during wartime.
The latest trigger is former Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov’s call for presidential elections during the war. According to Euronews, Fedorov made the demand after being removed from the defence ministry, while President Volodymyr Zelensky formally nominated Yevhen Khmara as his replacement, effectively closing the door on Fedorov’s return to government.
Fedorov’s intervention is particularly significant because he is not an opposition outsider. He was previously part of Zelensky’s political establishment and became one of the most prominent figures associated with Ukraine’s digital transformation and military technology.
So the question is no longer simply why was Fedorov dismissed?
The bigger question is:
Who created the political conditions that turned an internal government dispute into Ukraine’s most serious domestic political confrontation since the full-scale Russian invasion?
The Fedorov Bombshell Changes the Political Equation
Fedorov’s demand for elections represents a major escalation.
He has argued that Ukraine is experiencing a systemic governance crisis and that the country needs democratic renewal despite the continuing war. Reuters described the move as the first such demand for wartime elections from a major Ukrainian political figure since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.
That is politically important because elections would transform the dispute from an argument about individual ministers into a direct test of public legitimacy.
President Zelensky’s term formally expired in May 2024, but Ukraine has remained under martial law since the full-scale Russian invasion. Ukrainian law currently prevents elections during martial law, while the government has maintained that elections should take place when the security situation allows. Zelensky said earlier this year that elections would require security guarantees and a ceasefire.
Therefore, Fedorov is challenging not simply Zelensky’s policies but the political timetable of wartime Ukraine.
Was Zelensky Himself the Architect of the Crisis?
It would be too simplistic to say that Zelensky deliberately “drafted” the crisis.
There is no credible evidence proving that the Ukrainian president intentionally designed the confrontation with Fedorov in order to create a political crisis.
But that does not mean Zelensky’s decisions are irrelevant.
The crisis emerged through a series of political choices: Fedorov’s removal, tensions within the defence establishment, public dissatisfaction with military leadership, changes in the command structure and subsequent cabinet reshuffling.
Le Monde reported that Fedorov’s dismissal triggered protests and accusations of internal political manoeuvring, while Zelensky subsequently removed army chief Oleksandr Syrsky amid public pressure.
That sequence matters.
A government can unintentionally create a political crisis by attempting to control one problem and producing another.
That may be closer to what happened in Kyiv.
The Fedorov-Syrsky Conflict Was the First Warning
The political crisis cannot be understood without examining the conflict between Fedorov and Ukraine’s military leadership.
Fedorov represented a younger, technology-driven approach to warfare. His reputation was connected to Ukraine’s rapid development of drones and digital military capabilities.
Syrsky represented a more traditional military command structure.
Their disagreements therefore had a strategic dimension as well as a personal one.
When Fedorov was dismissed, protests emerged demanding his return and criticising the military leadership. Eventually Zelensky removed Syrsky as well. That sequence suggests that the government initially attempted to contain one internal dispute but ended up confronting pressure from both political and military constituencies.
This is where the phrase “political crisis” becomes appropriate.
The dispute moved from the defence ministry into the streets, parliament and ultimately the presidential debate.
Did Fedorov Plan the Crisis?
This is another question that requires caution.
Fedorov’s latest statement clearly has political consequences, but there is insufficient evidence to conclude that he planned the entire crisis from the beginning.
His position became stronger after his dismissal, and his public criticism has increasingly focused on corruption, transparency, competence and institutional reform.
Reuters reported that Fedorov criticised government inertia and argued that Ukraine needed democratic renewal. He did not formally announce a presidential campaign.
That distinction is important.
Calling for elections is not the same thing as announcing a candidacy.
Nevertheless, politically, Fedorov’s call puts him in direct competition with the existing establishment because any genuine presidential election would inevitably reopen the question of Zelensky’s future.
The Hidden Battle Is About Legitimacy
The deepest issue is not Fedorov versus Zelensky.
It is wartime legitimacy versus electoral legitimacy.
Zelensky’s argument is essentially that Ukraine cannot safely conduct normal elections while Russian missiles and drones continue to threaten the country and while millions of Ukrainians remain displaced or live outside government-controlled territory.
That is not an insignificant argument.
How would soldiers vote?
How would refugees abroad participate?
How would citizens in frontline communities vote safely?
How would Ukraine conduct campaigning without turning military locations into political targets?
How would occupied territories be represented?
These are genuine logistical and security problems. Legal analysis has also highlighted the complicated relationship between Ukraine’s constitution and martial-law legislation concerning elections.
But Fedorov’s argument introduces another problem:
How long can a democracy postpone elections before the absence of elections itself becomes a political crisis?
That is the dilemma now confronting Kyiv.
Russia Is an Obvious Beneficiary
Any analysis of Ukraine’s political crisis must consider Russia.
Moscow would obviously benefit from political instability inside Ukraine. A divided Ukrainian leadership could weaken military coordination, complicate relations with European allies and create uncertainty around future negotiations.
But saying Russia benefits from the crisis is very different from saying Russia created the crisis.
There is currently no publicly established evidence that Moscow engineered Fedorov’s dismissal, organised the protests or scripted his demand for elections.
This distinction is essential for an evidence-based analysis.
It is possible for Russia to exploit a crisis without having created it.
Indeed, political instability during wartime can become a strategic weapon even when the original dispute is entirely domestic.
What About the United States and Europe?
Western involvement is another obvious area of speculation, particularly because Ukraine’s electoral question has increasingly become part of the international discussion.
But again, the evidence does not justify claiming that Washington or European governments “drafted” the Fedorov crisis.
Zelensky has faced international pressure and debate over democratic renewal, but the immediate chain of events surrounding Fedorov’s dismissal appears rooted primarily in Ukraine’s own political and military institutions.
This distinction is particularly important for European policymakers.
Ukraine’s Western partners have a strong interest in Ukrainian stability, but excessive external pressure for elections during an active war could itself become destabilising.
The West therefore faces a difficult balancing act:
support democratic accountability without triggering political fragmentation during a national war.
The Bigger Problem: Centralisation of Power
The Fedorov confrontation also exposes a broader question about the concentration of political power around the presidency.
During wartime, centralisation can be necessary.
Governments need rapid decision-making.
Military procurement cannot operate like ordinary civilian administration.
Defence appointments cannot always be subjected to lengthy political negotiations.
But the same centralisation can produce a dangerous side effect: the weakening of institutional checks and political competition.
Le Monde’s reporting on the crisis highlighted criticism from opposition figures and parliamentary frustration over appointments and growing presidential centralisation.
This does not prove that Ukraine has ceased to be democratic.
But it does demonstrate why Fedorov’s election demand has found political resonance.
The longer wartime institutions operate without normal electoral competition, the more important questions about accountability become.
Why Fedorov Is More Dangerous Politically Than an Ordinary Opposition Figure
Fedorov’s importance comes partly from his background.
He emerged from inside the Zelensky political system rather than from an entirely separate opposition movement.
That gives his criticism a different political weight.
An external opposition politician can easily be dismissed as attempting to exploit the war.
A former senior government official can instead say:
I was inside the system, and I saw its problems.
That makes his allegations politically harder to neutralise.
His supporters can frame the conflict as a struggle between reform and bureaucracy, while Zelensky’s supporters can frame it as a dangerous internal confrontation at a time when Ukraine remains at war.
Both narratives have political power.
Is This a Coup, a Revolution or Normal Democratic Conflict?
At present, it is none of these.
There is no evidence of a military coup.
There is no evidence of a revolutionary overthrow.
And Ukraine’s political institutions have not collapsed.
What we are witnessing is better described as an increasingly open elite struggle inside a wartime political system.
The danger is that the struggle could escalate.
If Fedorov continues gaining public support, Zelensky will face pressure to demonstrate that his government remains open to competition and reform.
If Zelensky moves aggressively against Fedorov’s political network, critics could portray the move as evidence of authoritarian consolidation.
If elections are held too quickly, the opposition could accuse the government of manipulating the process, while Russia could attempt to exploit the resulting divisions.
There is no easy option.
Who Benefits From the Crisis?
The first beneficiary could be Fedorov himself.
His dismissal has given him something that government officials rarely possess: political independence.
The second potential beneficiary is the wider Ukrainian opposition, which now has an opportunity to challenge the political establishment without waiting for the end of the war.
The third beneficiary is Russia, because every internal dispute creates another opportunity for information warfare and political pressure.
But the biggest potential loser is Ukraine’s institutional credibility.
If Ukrainians begin believing that government appointments are based primarily on loyalty, while the government believes elections are too dangerous to conduct, the space between public expectations and political institutions could widen.
That is much more dangerous than one minister being dismissed.
The Real “Draft” Was a Chain of Decisions
So, who drafted Ukraine’s political crisis?
The evidence does not support naming a single mastermind.
The crisis appears to have been constructed through a chain of decisions, rivalries and institutional pressures rather than written by one actor.
Zelensky’s government made decisions over defence leadership.
Fedorov challenged aspects of the system.
Military leadership became politically controversial.
Public protests increased pressure on the president.
Syrsky was eventually removed.
Fedorov remained outside government.
And now Fedorov has transformed his political dispute into a national argument about elections.
That is how political crises often develop.
They are rarely written by one person. They emerge when several unresolved conflicts collide at the same time.
Ukraine’s Next Political Test
The next stage could be more consequential than Fedorov’s dismissal itself.
If the war continues, Ukraine will have to determine how and when electoral politics can return.
If a ceasefire or security guarantees emerge, pressure for elections will likely increase dramatically.
If the war continues indefinitely, the argument over democratic legitimacy will become harder to postpone.
And if Fedorov builds a broader political coalition, the next presidential election could become much more competitive than Zelensky’s political environment has been since 2022.
That is why his latest statement matters.
It is not simply a former minister asking for an election.
It is the first major internal challenge to the wartime political model from someone who previously belonged to the establishment itself.
Ukraine’s Crisis Is About the Future, Not Just Zelensky
The most important lesson from the Fedorov episode is that Ukraine’s political crisis should not automatically be interpreted through a Russian-versus-Western lens.
Ukraine has genuine internal political tensions.
The war has created extraordinary pressure on its institutions.
The government has had to balance military necessity against democratic accountability.
And now a former senior official is openly arguing that the balance has moved too far toward wartime centralisation.
There is no evidence that one person or foreign power “drafted” the entire crisis.
The stronger explanation is that Ukraine’s political system has reached a pressure point created by four years of war, centralised decision-making, military disagreements, corruption concerns, public frustration and the unresolved question of elections.
Fedorov’s call for presidential elections has simply brought those contradictions into the open.
The ultimate question for Ukraine is therefore not merely “Will Zelensky face Fedorov?”
It is:
Can Ukraine preserve wartime unity without sacrificing the democratic legitimacy for which it says it is fighting?
That will be one of Kyiv’s most consequential political tests of 2026.
