The question of whether Iran can actually block the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb simultaneously has become one of the most consequential questions for the global economy. The answer is complicated: Iran does not have direct sovereign control over both waterways, but it has demonstrated the ability to make both extremely dangerous, expensive and economically disruptive.
That distinction matters.
The Strait of Hormuz lies between Iran and Oman and is one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints. Bab el-Mandeb, by contrast, lies between Yemen and the Horn of Africa. Iran does not control Bab el-Mandeb directly. Its influence comes primarily through the Iran-aligned Houthi movement in Yemen. Recent Houthi advances toward the Red Sea chokepoint have therefore transformed what was previously a theoretical “two-front blockade” scenario into a much more serious global economic risk.
The latest escalation also comes as Washington and Tehran remain locked in a dangerous confrontation. Recent warnings from President Donald Trump over activity at Iran’s Pickaxe Mountain facility demonstrate that the nuclear and military confrontation remains highly volatile, while the economic consequences of the wider conflict are increasingly spreading beyond the Middle East.
Hormuz Is Iran’s Strongest Economic Weapon
If there is one maritime chokepoint where Iran possesses genuine geographical leverage, it is the Strait of Hormuz.
The waterway connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. Before the current crisis, approximately 20.9 million barrels per day of oil passed through Hormuz during the first half of 2025, equivalent to roughly one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption. Around one-quarter of globally traded maritime oil also moved through the strait.
Even more important is LNG. More than 20% of global LNG trade passed through Hormuz during the first half of 2025, much of it originating in Qatar.
This explains why Tehran repeatedly refers to Hormuz as a strategic card.
Iran does not necessarily need to physically close every metre of the strait. Mines, anti-ship missiles, drones, fast attack craft, missile boats and attacks against commercial vessels could be enough to make shipping companies decide that passage is commercially unacceptable.
That is the real meaning of a blockade.
A chokepoint does not have to be completely closed to become economically blocked.
If insurance companies dramatically increase premiums, tanker owners refuse voyages and crews become unwilling to enter the area, the economic effect can resemble a physical closure.
Recent shipping data illustrates the scale of the problem. On September 10, only seven vessels were recorded transiting Hormuz, compared with a pre-war daily average of around 125 commercial vessels.
Iran therefore possesses significant disruption power, even if its ability to maintain a permanent military blockade against a major international naval coalition is much less certain.
But Can Iran Really Close Hormuz Completely?
This is where the propaganda surrounding the issue often becomes misleading.
Iran can threaten Hormuz. It can attack shipping. It can deploy mines and missiles. It can make the waterway extremely dangerous.
But permanently sealing Hormuz against the United States and other major naval powers would be a completely different challenge.
The United States and its allies have extensive naval, air and surveillance capabilities in the region. A prolonged Iranian closure would almost certainly trigger a major military response.
There are also alternative pipelines. The EIA estimates that Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline and the UAE’s Abu Dhabi pipeline together can bypass roughly 4.7 million barrels per day of Hormuz capacity. That is nowhere near enough to replace the entire 20.9 million barrels per day normally moving through the strait, but it demonstrates why “Iran closes Hormuz” does not automatically mean “the entire world’s oil supply stops.”
The real danger is therefore not an absolute shutdown.
It is partial disruption lasting long enough to shock markets.
Bab el-Mandeb Is a Different Story
The second part of the equation is much more complicated.
Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and is the southern gateway toward the Suez Canal. It is therefore essential for trade between Asia and Europe.
But Iran does not own Yemen and does not directly command Bab el-Mandeb.
The key actor is the Houthi movement, which is closely aligned with Tehran but maintains its own political and military interests.
That distinction is essential when assessing Iran’s actual power.
The recent Houthi capture of Mocha and advance toward strategic islands, including Perim, has nevertheless dramatically increased the threat to maritime traffic. Reuters reported that Houthi forces had taken control of Perim Island and the coastal town of Dhubab, positions that could significantly improve their ability to threaten shipping through Bab el-Mandeb.
In other words, Iran does not need to physically occupy Bab el-Mandeb to benefit from disruption there.
A capable regional partner can create the same economic pressure at a fraction of the cost.
The Two-Chokepoint Strategy Could Be Far More Dangerous
This is where the current crisis becomes economically significant.
Hormuz affects energy leaving the Persian Gulf.
Bab el-Mandeb affects the maritime corridor connecting the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea and Suez Canal.
If both routes are simultaneously threatened, shipping companies face a nightmare.
A tanker leaving the Gulf could encounter danger at Hormuz. A container ship travelling between Asia and Europe could face another threat at Bab el-Mandeb. The logical alternative would be to travel around the Cape of Good Hope.
But that means dramatically longer voyages.
The consequences include higher fuel consumption, additional crew costs, higher insurance premiums, more ships required to maintain the same delivery schedule and delayed cargoes.
The experience since the Houthi attacks began in 2023 already demonstrates this mechanism. EIA data shows that oil flows through Bab el-Mandeb fell to approximately 4.2 million barrels per day in the first half of 2025, roughly half the 2023 level. Companies increasingly avoided the route and diverted vessels around Africa.
So the economic weapon is not necessarily “closure.”
It is forced rerouting.
The Real Global Cost Is Bigger Than the Oil Price
The most common mistake in analysing the Hormuz crisis is to focus only on petrol prices.
The economic impact is much broader.
Higher crude prices increase transportation costs. More expensive diesel raises the cost of moving food, industrial goods and manufactured products. Petrochemical producers face higher feedstock costs. Airlines face higher fuel expenses. Shipping companies increase freight rates.
Eventually, those costs reach consumers.
That creates a second problem: inflation.
Current developments show how rapidly the shock can move through markets. Brent crude has moved above $100 per barrel amid the worsening Middle East crisis, while tanker rates have reached extraordinary levels. Reuters reported that the cost of chartering a very large crude carrier from the Gulf of Oman to China reached roughly $11.50 per barrel, its highest level since the rate was introduced earlier in the year.
That is not simply an energy-market story.
It becomes a global inflation story.
Europe Could Be Among the Biggest Losers
Europe is particularly exposed because its trade relationship with Asia depends heavily on maritime routes through the Red Sea and Suez.
If Bab el-Mandeb becomes dangerous and vessels increasingly avoid the route, Asian-European trade takes longer and becomes more expensive.
If Hormuz is simultaneously disrupted, Europe can face another problem: tighter global competition for alternative energy supplies.
That creates an uncomfortable chain reaction.
Middle East instability → higher oil and gas prices → higher transportation costs → higher production costs → higher consumer inflation → pressure on central banks.
The European Central Bank and other central banks could therefore face a difficult policy dilemma. Fighting inflation through higher interest rates can weaken economic growth precisely when businesses are already suffering from expensive energy and disrupted supply chains.
Asia May Be Hit Even Harder by Hormuz Disruption
Ironically, the largest direct consumers of Gulf oil are not necessarily Western economies.
The EIA estimates that around 89% of crude oil and condensate moving through Hormuz went to Asian markets during the first half of 2025. China, India, Japan and South Korea together accounted for approximately 74% of Hormuz crude and condensate flows.
This means a prolonged Hormuz crisis could create enormous economic pressure across Asia.
China would face higher energy-import costs. India would confront increased oil-import bills. Japan and South Korea would face additional energy-security risks.
The consequences could therefore spread through Asian manufacturing, transportation and consumer prices before eventually affecting European and American markets.
The Saudi Pipeline Problem Makes the Situation More Dangerous
Another important development is Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline.
The pipeline is designed to allow Saudi crude to reach the Red Sea without passing through Hormuz. That makes it an important insurance policy against Iranian disruption.
But recent attacks temporarily shut the pipeline, removing part of the very alternative capacity designed to reduce Hormuz dependence. Reuters reported that the pipeline represents roughly 4–5% of global oil supply, while Saudi crude exports have fallen sharply amid the broader disruption.
This demonstrates an important strategic reality:
Alternative routes only work if they remain secure.
If Hormuz is threatened while Saudi pipelines and Red Sea infrastructure are also attacked, the world’s ability to compensate for lost Gulf exports becomes much weaker.
Is Iran Winning an Economic War Through Geography?
Not necessarily.
Iran possesses an extraordinary geographic advantage, but geography is not the same as unlimited power.
The current crisis is already damaging Iran itself. Reuters reported that the U.S.-led economic campaign and naval pressure have severely weakened Iran’s oil exports and created shortages, currency problems and rising domestic prices.
This creates a paradox for Tehran.
Iran can disrupt global energy markets, but doing so also damages its own economy.
The longer Hormuz remains unstable, the more pressure Iran faces from sanctions, declining exports, reduced foreign currency earnings and domestic economic stress.
Therefore, Tehran’s strongest strategy may not be to destroy the international shipping system.
It may be to demonstrate that it can destroy it if pushed too far.
That threat itself creates bargaining power.
Bab el-Mandeb Gives Iran an Additional Layer of Pressure
The Houthi factor changes the strategic calculation.
If Tehran can influence a partner capable of threatening Bab el-Mandeb while Iranian forces threaten Hormuz, the United States and its allies are forced to defend two geographically separated maritime corridors.
That stretches naval resources.
It also complicates diplomacy.
A settlement with Tehran might reduce the Hormuz threat without automatically resolving the Yemen problem. Likewise, a ceasefire in Yemen might not eliminate Iran’s ability to threaten Gulf shipping.
This is why the current crisis cannot be understood simply as an Iran-U.S. confrontation.
It has become a regional maritime security crisis with global economic consequences.
The $100 Oil Warning Is Only the Beginning
The most important question is what happens if the disruption lasts for months rather than days.
The EIA says global oil inventories have already fallen by around 400 million barrels during 2026, while Middle Eastern production shut-ins reached 6.7 million barrels per day in August. It expects substantial disruption to continue into 2027.
That changes the calculation.
A short disruption can be absorbed through inventories, alternative pipelines, strategic reserves and rerouting.
A prolonged disruption becomes much harder.
If inventories continue falling while production remains offline, the market eventually begins pricing not merely today’s shortage but tomorrow’s shortage.
That is when oil prices can become politically explosive.
So, Can Iran Block Both Straits?
The most accurate answer is not in the conventional sense.
Iran does not possess uncontested military control over Hormuz, and it certainly does not directly control Bab el-Mandeb.
But Iran has something arguably more important: the ability to create maritime insecurity across both strategic corridors through different mechanisms.
At Hormuz, Tehran has direct geographic and military leverage.
At Bab el-Mandeb, its influence operates through the Houthis and Yemen’s fractured political and military landscape.
The distinction between “controlling” and “disrupting” is therefore critical.
Iran may not be able to permanently close both waterways against the combined military power of the United States and its partners. But it can potentially make both routes so dangerous and expensive that commercial operators voluntarily avoid them.
And that may be enough.
The Real Global Economic Cost
The greatest danger is not that Iran suddenly turns off 20% of global oil supply.
The greater danger is a cascade effect.
A threatened Hormuz raises oil prices. A threatened Bab el-Mandeb raises shipping costs. Attacks on alternative infrastructure reduce the ability to reroute supplies. Longer journeys consume more fuel. Insurance premiums rise. Freight rates increase. Energy-intensive industries face higher costs. Inflation returns. Central banks face renewed pressure. Consumers lose purchasing power.
That is how a regional military confrontation becomes a global economic crisis.
The latest escalation around Pickaxe Mountain shows that the military confrontation between Washington and Tehran remains capable of expanding rapidly. At the same time, the Houthi advance around Bab el-Mandeb demonstrates that the conflict can spread geographically even without Iran directly deploying conventional forces into Yemen.
The biggest strategic lesson is therefore clear:
Iran does not need to own both Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb to have global economic power. It only needs to make both routes uncertain.
That is the real weapon.
And if uncertainty persists long enough, the world’s consumers, manufacturers, shipping companies and governments—not just Iran and its adversaries—will ultimately pay the price.
