The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement was supposed to demonstrate a new era of regional security. Signed by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye in August 2026, the pact declared that an armed attack against one member would be treated as an attack against all. On paper, it looked like a major step toward collective Muslim security and a powerful deterrent against regional threats.
But within weeks, the alliance is facing the very test it was created to confront.
Saudi Arabia is now under pressure from multiple directions. Iran-backed Houthi forces have intensified attacks from Yemen and moved toward strategically important Red Sea territory, while drone attacks launched from Iraqi territory have struck Saudi infrastructure. The kingdom has even been forced to suspend operations on its East-West oil pipeline, a route specifically designed to reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz.
This raises a much more uncomfortable question:
Has Iran actually been pushed away by the Makkah Pact—or has Tehran found a way to make the alliance’s members confront a much wider regional war?
And an even bigger question is emerging in Islamabad:
If attacks on Saudi Arabia originate from Iraqi territory, does the Makkah Pact eventually force Pakistan into a confrontation with Iraq?
The answer, at least for now, is no. Pakistan has explicitly said that no military response under the pact has been discussed following the recent Houthi attacks.
But that does not mean the problem has disappeared.
It means the Makkah Pact is entering its most dangerous phase.
The Makkah Pact Was Designed as Deterrence—Not an Automatic War Machine
The first misunderstanding surrounding the agreement is that it automatically obliges Pakistan and Türkiye to launch military operations whenever Saudi Arabia is attacked.
That interpretation is too simplistic.
The pact establishes a collective-defence principle, but its practical military mechanisms remain less clear. The full text has not been publicly released, and the exact procedures for responding to an attack have therefore remained subject to interpretation.
Pakistan’s latest statement is particularly significant.
Islamabad says it remains committed to the agreement but has not discussed an immediate military response to the attacks on Saudi Arabia.
This is not necessarily weakness.
It may be an attempt to preserve the distinction between deterrence and escalation.
Pakistan wants Saudi Arabia to believe that the pact has military credibility, while simultaneously avoiding a situation in which an attack by an Iranian-aligned militia automatically drags Pakistani forces into another Middle Eastern war.
That balancing act is becoming extremely difficult.
Iran Has Not Been Removed From the Equation
The Makkah Pact was widely interpreted as an attempt to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s security environment at a time when Iranian influence remained a major concern.
Yet Iran has not disappeared.
Instead, the regional battlefield has become more complicated.
Iran has relationships with armed groups across Yemen and Iraq. The Houthis have intensified their campaign against Saudi interests, while Iraqi militias aligned with Tehran remain a major political and military force inside Iraq. Reuters reported that Iraq’s powerful Iran-aligned militia network includes tens of thousands of fighters and that Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is struggling to force them to disarm.
This creates an important strategic problem for the Makkah alliance.
Saudi Arabia may have strengthened its formal defence partnerships.
But its opponents do not necessarily have to attack Saudi Arabia through a conventional Iranian military operation.
They can use multiple pressure points simultaneously.
That is precisely what makes the present crisis different.
The Iraqi Front Is the New Strategic Nightmare
The most serious development may not actually be Yemen.
It may be Iraq.
Saudi authorities have reported that drones targeting the kingdom’s critical East-West oil pipeline were launched from Iraqi territory. Iraq subsequently confirmed that the attacks originated in Maysan province and launched an investigation, while Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi dismissed the provincial operations commander.
Saudi Arabia has so far avoided retaliating against Iraq, reportedly after the Iraqi prime minister asked Riyadh to allow Baghdad to deal with the perpetrators.
This is enormously important.
Because if Riyadh retaliates against Iraq, the regional crisis changes completely.
Saudi Arabia would no longer simply be confronting an armed group.
It could be perceived as confronting Iraqi territory.
And that creates a diplomatic nightmare for Pakistan.
Could Pakistan Attack Iraq Under the Makkah Pact?
At present, there is no evidence that Pakistan is preparing to attack Iraq, and Islamabad has explicitly said that no military response under the Makkah agreement has been discussed over the latest attacks.
But the hypothetical exposes one of the pact’s biggest weaknesses.
What happens if Saudi Arabia is attacked by a militia operating from Iraq?
Is that an attack by Iraq?
Or an attack by an independent armed group?
Would the Makkah Pact apply?
And if it applies, would Pakistan be expected to act militarily against the Iraqi state, the militia responsible, or simply support Saudi Arabia defensively?
These questions have not been fully tested.
That is why the Iraqi drone attacks are potentially more important for the future of the Makkah Pact than they initially appear.
Pakistan Has a Much Bigger Problem Than Choosing Saudi Arabia
Pakistan’s position is uniquely complicated.
It is a defence partner of Saudi Arabia.
It is a signatory to the Makkah Pact.
But it also shares a long border with Iran.
Pakistan has repeatedly tried to maintain communication with Tehran while strengthening its relationship with Riyadh.
Recent Reuters reporting shows Islamabad has already been attempting to persuade Iran to restrain the Houthis while simultaneously maintaining its commitments to Saudi Arabia.
That makes Pakistan a potential mediator—but also a potential target of suspicion from both sides.
If Pakistan becomes militarily involved in Yemen or Iraq, it risks damaging its relationship with Iran.
If Pakistan refuses to act after a major attack on Saudi Arabia, the credibility of the Makkah Pact could be questioned.
Islamabad is therefore trapped between alliance credibility and regional de-escalation.
Has Iran “Flown Away” From the Makkah Pact?
If the question is whether Iran has escaped the strategic pressure created by the Makkah Pact, the answer is more complicated.
Iran has not joined the alliance.
It has not accepted its security framework.
And it remains outside the three-country defence structure.
But Tehran may have successfully shifted the battlefield away from a conventional Saudi-Iran confrontation.
Instead of Saudi Arabia confronting Iranian forces directly, the kingdom is facing pressure from Iran-aligned actors in Yemen and Iraq.
That gives Tehran a degree of strategic distance.
Iran can deny direct responsibility for every individual attack while its regional partners continue to create pressure.
This is one reason proxy warfare is so difficult to defeat.
The alliance can respond to a missile.
It is much harder to respond to the political and military network behind the missile.
Saudi Arabia’s Biggest Crisis Is Not Just Military
The most dangerous aspect of the current crisis for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman may actually be economic.
Saudi Arabia’s economic transformation strategy depends heavily on stability.
Vision 2030 requires massive investment, tourism, infrastructure development and international confidence.
But the kingdom’s security environment is moving in the opposite direction.
The Houthis have intensified attacks against Saudi targets, while Iraqi-origin drone attacks have threatened the country’s critical oil infrastructure. At the same time, the Red Sea shipping route is under growing pressure after Houthi forces captured the strategic port of Mocha and advanced along Yemen’s western coast.
This creates a dangerous economic equation:
Saudi Arabia wants to become the Middle East’s investment and logistics hub—but its geographical position is increasingly becoming the battlefield of regional power competition.
The East-West Pipeline Was Supposed to Be Saudi Arabia’s Insurance Policy
This may be the most revealing part of the crisis.
Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline exists partly to bypass Hormuz.
Instead of sending all crude through the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia can transport oil across the kingdom to Yanbu on the Red Sea.
That gives Riyadh an alternative export route if Hormuz becomes dangerous.
But the latest drone attacks forced Saudi Arabia to shut the pipeline temporarily as a precaution.
This means the kingdom is now facing a disturbing possibility:
Iran can threaten Hormuz, while Iran-aligned forces can threaten the alternative route around Hormuz.
That is strategically far more serious than a simple Strait of Hormuz crisis.
The Two-Chokepoint Problem Is Becoming a Saudi Problem
The Red Sea makes the situation even more dangerous.
The Houthis’ advance around Mocha and toward Bab el-Mandeb threatens another critical maritime corridor.
Saudi Arabia therefore faces pressure around three interconnected strategic spaces:
Hormuz in the east.
Iraq on its northern and northeastern flank.
Yemen and Bab el-Mandeb in the south and southwest.
This is why the Makkah Pact is being tested so quickly.
The alliance was created to provide collective security, but Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability is geographical.
No defence agreement can move Saudi Arabia away from the Middle East’s most contested strategic corridors.
Why Saudi Arabia May Be Facing Its Biggest Crisis After the Pact
The irony is striking.
The Makkah Pact was intended to make Saudi Arabia safer.
Instead, its emergence has coincided with an escalation that exposes every weakness in the kingdom’s security architecture.
This does not necessarily mean the pact caused the crisis.
It means the agreement has raised expectations.
Before the pact, Saudi Arabia could rely heavily on its bilateral relationship with the United States and manage its relations with Iran through diplomacy.
Now the kingdom has created a new collective-defence structure.
That creates a credibility test.
If Saudi Arabia is attacked repeatedly and Pakistan and Türkiye do not respond, critics could ask whether the pact is merely symbolic.
But if Pakistan and Türkiye respond militarily, the alliance could become involved in a much larger regional war.
Saudi Arabia therefore faces a classic deterrence dilemma: the pact must look powerful enough to prevent escalation, but it must not become a mechanism that automatically produces escalation.
Türkiye Is Also Being Pulled Into a Difficult Position
Türkiye adds another layer to the equation.
Ankara is a NATO member and maintains relationships with the United States and Europe while simultaneously pursuing its own regional strategy.
The Makkah Pact allows Türkiye to increase its influence in the Gulf without abandoning its existing Western relationships.
But if the agreement becomes involved in a confrontation with Iranian-aligned groups in Iraq or Yemen, Ankara will face a difficult choice.
Does it deploy?
Does it provide intelligence and air defence?
Does it support Saudi Arabia diplomatically?
Or does it push for negotiations?
The ambiguity that makes the pact politically flexible may become a weakness during a crisis.
Iran’s Greatest Weapon May Be Strategic Ambiguity
Tehran does not necessarily need to destroy the Makkah Pact.
It may be more effective to test it.
An attack through a Houthi group creates one type of dilemma.
An attack from an Iraqi militia creates another.
A cyberattack would create another.
A maritime attack creates another.
Each incident forces Saudi Arabia and its partners to decide whether it qualifies as an act of aggression covered by their collective-defence commitment.
This creates uncertainty.
And uncertainty can be strategically useful.
Iran therefore does not necessarily need to “beat” the Makkah Pact militarily.
It can attempt to make the alliance politically difficult to activate.
The United States Is Also Watching Carefully
Washington has traditionally been a central security partner for Saudi Arabia.
But the present crisis demonstrates why Riyadh is diversifying its security partnerships.
The Makkah Pact does not necessarily replace the United States. Analysts have described it more plausibly as a diversification mechanism rather than a substitution for existing alliances.
That is particularly important after the recent instability surrounding U.S. policy in the region.
Saudi Arabia wants more options.
Pakistan provides manpower and military experience.
Türkiye provides a major regional military power and NATO-linked capabilities.
The United States provides advanced technology, intelligence and strategic reach.
Saudi Arabia wants all three.
But managing three different security relationships during an active regional crisis is much harder than signing agreements during peacetime.
The Makkah Pact’s Real Test Has Arrived Earlier Than Expected
The alliance is barely a month old, yet its fundamental question has already emerged:
What exactly counts as an attack on Saudi Arabia?
If a Houthi missile strikes Riyadh, the answer seems relatively straightforward.
But what if a drone is launched by a militia from Iraq?
What if the Iraqi government says it did not authorize the attack?
What if Iran denies involvement?
What if the militia operates independently?
What if Saudi Arabia retaliates against the launch site and Baghdad objects?
This is where the difference between collective defence on paper and collective defence in practice becomes enormous.
Pakistan Cannot Afford to Become the Region’s Permanent Warrior
For Islamabad, there is also an economic calculation.
Pakistan needs Saudi investment, Gulf financial support and stable energy supplies.
At the same time, it needs a workable relationship with Iran because of geography and border security.
It also needs to avoid becoming trapped in another prolonged overseas military commitment.
That is why Islamabad’s current position—condemn attacks, maintain the pact, communicate with Iran, but avoid immediate military escalation—is understandable.
Pakistan is trying to keep the alliance credible without allowing the alliance to dictate every move.
Whether that balance survives a larger attack remains the real question.
The Bigger Battle Is Over the Future of Middle Eastern Security
The Makkah Pact should therefore not be judged simply by whether Pakistan sends troops.
Its larger significance is that Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye are attempting to construct a regional security mechanism at a moment when the old Middle Eastern security architecture is under enormous pressure.
The United States remains important.
Iran remains powerful.
Israel remains militarily dominant.
Gulf states are expanding their own defence capabilities.
Türkiye is increasing its regional influence.
Pakistan is seeking a larger strategic role.
And non-state armed groups increasingly possess missiles, drones and sophisticated military networks.
The region is moving toward a multi-layered security order.
The Makkah Pact is one part of that transformation.
So, Who Is Actually Winning?
It would be premature to say Iran has defeated the Makkah Pact.
But it would be equally premature to claim that the pact has successfully contained Iran.
The current evidence suggests something more complicated.
Iran and its aligned groups have demonstrated that they can create simultaneous pressure across Saudi Arabia’s eastern, northern and southern approaches.
Saudi Arabia has demonstrated that it can build new partnerships.
Pakistan has demonstrated that it wants to avoid automatic military escalation.
Iraq is attempting to prevent its territory from becoming a launchpad for attacks on Saudi Arabia.
And Türkiye is being drawn deeper into Gulf security.
Nobody has yet achieved decisive control.
The Real Crisis for Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia’s biggest problem after the Makkah Pact is not that the agreement has failed.
The bigger problem is that the agreement has created expectations at exactly the moment when Saudi Arabia’s security environment is becoming more complicated.
Riyadh now needs to prove that its new partners can provide meaningful security.
But Pakistan does not want a war with Iran.
Türkiye does not want uncontrolled escalation.
Iraq does not want its territory turned into a battlefield.
And Saudi Arabia itself does not want another devastating regional conflict while it is attempting to transform its economy.
That is the central contradiction.
The Makkah Pact was born from the desire for collective security.
But the current crisis is testing whether collective security can exist without collective escalation.
Iran has not “flown away” from the Makkah Pact.
If anything, Tehran’s regional strategy appears to have adapted to it.
Rather than confronting the new alliance directly, Iran-aligned forces are creating pressure through Yemen, Iraq and maritime routes, forcing Saudi Arabia and its partners to decide where deterrence ends and war begins.
And Pakistan is not currently preparing to attack Iraq. The latest official position is that no military response under the Makkah Pact has been discussed.
But the Iraqi drone attacks reveal a potentially explosive future scenario.
If attacks on Saudi Arabia continue to originate from Iraqi territory, the Makkah Pact will eventually face its defining question:
Can Pakistan and Türkiye defend Saudi Arabia without becoming participants in a much larger war against Iran-aligned forces across the Middle East?
That may be the real test of the Makkah Pact.
And for Mohammed bin Salman, the biggest challenge is no longer simply building a new alliance.
It is proving that the alliance can protect Saudi Arabia without destroying the regional stability on which Vision 2030 depends.
