When Pakistani and Afghan forces exchanged deadly fire on October 11–12, the incident was widely portrayed by global media as a bilateral border clash. But within few hours the global media was made to realise by the Pakistan’s diplomatic and military response that beneath the conventional frame lies a deeper strategic drama—one in which India, empowered by the ideological contours of a “Doval doctrine,” is quietly recasting Afghanistan from Pakistan’s asset into Pakistan’s vulnerability.
India’s Afghan Resurgence: From Isolation to Influence
India’s announcement in October 2025 that it would reopen its embassy in Kabul marked a decisive shift in New Delhi’s posture toward the Taliban‐ruled Kabul. Earlier, in January 2025, the Taliban themselves acknowledged India as a “significant regional and economic partner” after high-level diplomatic engagement. These steps signal New Delhi’s recalibration: no formal recognition yet, but clear operational engagement, especially through trade, infrastructure and soft power channels.
For Islamabad, this is a red flag precisely because India’s re-entry into Afghanistan is viewed through a zero-sum lens. Historically, Pakistan has responded to Indian influence in Kabul by quoting security alarms, insinuating that Delhi might use Afghanistan as a hostile encampment to bleed Pakistan.
Doval Doctrine and the “Taliban as a foil” Paradigm
Across Indian strategic discourse, the so-called “Doval doctrine” has become shorthand for a doctrine of assertive counterterrorism and preemptive operations targeting Pakistan. As one analyst put it: “Its response was to do unto the enemy what was being done to you.”
In practice, critics allege it manifests as a blend of kinetic retaliation, covert influence, disinformation warfare, and strategic pressure campaigns (diplomatic isolation, internal destabilization).
In this doctrine’s logic, the Taliban — once a strategic asset for Pakistan — could become a variable. India may hope to deepen rapport with elements of the Afghan government, enabling pressure points on Pakistan’s western frontier. Kabul, in turn, gains negotiating space, project legitimacy, and new economic lifelines from India, lessening its dependence on Islamabad. The transformation is subtle: from proxy terrain to pivot leverage.
Pakistan’s Military Playbook: Gimmick or Grave Strategy?
In Pakistan’s domestic politics, narratives of Indian conspiracies often confer cohesion and purpose to the military establishment. Some political trolls and commentators suggest the October border escalation is choreographed—playacting to bolster the generals’ political relevance. While such theories deserve healthy skepticism, they do underscore a recurring dynamic: external threats (real or perceived) are used to justify internal control.
But regardless the risk is real. By narrating Indian-Taliban collusion, the Pakistani military could inadvertently trap itself into escalation cycles. The more Islamabad militarizes the border narrative, the more incentives India and Afghanistan have to entrench alternative corridors and influence.
Where Trump’s Bagram Gambit Fits In
In September 2025, Donald Trump asserted that the U.S. should reclaim control of Bagram Air Base, warning of geopolitical consequences if the Taliban refuse. That gambit reverberated across the region because India, Pakistan and China jointly opposed the proposal during the Moscow Format consultations, signaling a rare alignment. While the Taliban swiftly rejected foreign military bases, their resistance only elevated Bagram’s symbolic value as a locus of regional contest.
Trump’s bid also plays into India’s anxieties: Bagram’s proximity to parts of China, and its capacity for force projection, offers a lever for global power brokers—in India’s calculus, any American foothold in Afghanistan is a factor to be managed carefully.
China, the CPEC Anchor, and the Mediator Shadow
China sits at the crossroads. Its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) stakes—namely CPEC passing through Pakistan—make it acutely sensitive to any destabilization. Beijing’s presence in Gwadar and infrastructure linkages place it as both an investor and a tension buffer. A resurgent Pakistan–Afghan conflict risks threatening Chinese investments and forcing Beijing into uneasy mediation or coercion. Chinese diplomacy may also hedge by nudging both sides toward containment, especially if New Delhi’s Afghan deepening alarms Beijing.
Gulf mediators like Qatar and Saudi Arabia will also play broker roles. Already visible in post-clash appeals for calm, they maintain leverage especially in Taliban circles given their previous conduit roles. Their influence could tilt crisis management discourse away from pure bilateral warfare back into multilateral verification frameworks.
A New Cold Front along the Durand Line
The India–Afghanistan–Pakistan nexus is crystallizing into a densified geopolitical contest. India’s deeper engagement in Kabul, strategically enabled by Doval’s doctrine, rewrites the paradigm that Afghanistan is no longer Islamabad’s backyard, but New Delhi’s competitive frontier. Pakistan’s responses—whether escalatory border posturing or political mobilization, may project strength in domestic storytelling, but risk strategic overreach.
Trump’s Bagram gambit adds a global dimension because it reinforces that Afghanistan remains a chessboard for extra-regional powers. China’s deep stakes, regional mediators’ roles, and the fragile balance in the borderlands combine to make this not a border skirmish, but a potential long-term fault line.
For Pakistan, the resurgence of India’s Afghan leverage demands strategic introspection. By simply relying on historical influence in Kabul may no longer suffice. The question now is whether Islamabad adapts (through diplomacy, verification, and confidence-building) or ossifies into reactionary posture—risking the very instability it seeks to contain.
