For more than four years, the Russia-Ukraine war has increasingly become a contest of economic endurance.
Ukraine is now attempting to raise the cost of war inside Russia by targeting economic infrastructure, logistics networks, warehouses, oil facilities and supply chains. At the same time, the European Union is tightening sanctions designed to reduce Moscow’s energy revenues, restrict access to technology and weaken Russia’s financial and military-industrial capacity.
The latest attacks on Russian e-commerce infrastructure illustrate this new strategy.
On 24 August, Ukrainian drones targeted four logistics hubs belonging to Russian e-commerce giant Ozon in southern Russia. Kyiv’s broader argument is that commercial logistics networks can support Russia’s wartime supply system.
Russia is under genuine economic pressure, but it has also demonstrated an extraordinary ability to adapt.
Ukraine Is Changing the Target List
Ukraine’s strategy appears to be evolving beyond conventional military targets.
Instead of concentrating exclusively on Russian military bases, weapons factories and ammunition depots, Ukrainian forces have increasingly targeted the infrastructure that keeps Russia’s wartime economy functioning.
That includes oil refineries, fuel depots, warehouses and logistics centres.
The Ozon attacks follow a broader campaign against Russian e-commerce infrastructure. Earlier in August, Ukraine targeted numerous logistics facilities operated by Wildberries, Russia’s largest online retailer. Kyiv says such facilities can be connected to Moscow’s military supply networks.
The logic is straightforward.
A modern war requires much more than tanks and missiles. It requires transportation, fuel, storage, workers, financial resources, spare parts and industrial production.
If Ukraine can disrupt those systems repeatedly, it can potentially increase the cost of sustaining Russia’s military operations.
Russia Is Already Feeling Pressure in the Fuel Market
There are signs that the economic campaign is producing tangible disruptions.
Russian fuel supplies have become particularly vulnerable.
According to Reuters, Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian refineries, combined with seasonal demand and operational problems, have contributed to gasoline shortages across Russia. Moscow has imposed restrictions on fuel sales, banned fuel exports and begun importing petroleum products to stabilize the domestic market.
This is strategically significant.
Russia is one of the world’s major energy producers and has historically used its energy strength as a source of economic and geopolitical power.
Yet the war is creating a strange reversal: a country that exports enormous quantities of energy is increasingly struggling to ensure sufficient refined fuel reaches its own domestic market.
That does not mean Russia’s energy system is collapsing.
But it demonstrates that physical infrastructure remains a vulnerability even when a country has abundant natural resources.
Oil Is Still Russia’s Economic Lifeline
The biggest question is whether Ukraine and Europe can consistently damage Russia’s most important economic source: energy.
Oil and gas revenues remain central to Moscow’s ability to finance government spending and the war.
Ukraine’s attacks have also affected Russian oil exports. Reuters reported that crude shipments from Russia’s western ports fell below planned levels during the first half of August after disruptions at the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, where Ukrainian attacks had affected operations.
But Russia has repeatedly demonstrated that it can redirect exports.
Moscow has expanded its use of alternative shipping routes, non-Western buyers and what European governments describe as a shadow-fleet ecosystem.
That is why sanctions alone are unlikely to deliver an immediate economic knockout.
The strategy has to work through cumulative pressure.
The EU Is Trying to Close Russia’s Escape Routes
This is where Europe’s strategy becomes particularly important.
The European Union adopted its 21st sanctions package in July 2026, targeting energy, financial services, cryptocurrency, trade and Russia’s military-industrial complex. The European Commission said Russia’s economy was slowing sharply and that more than two-thirds of the liquid assets of its sovereign wealth fund had been depleted since the beginning of the war.
The figures are significant.
According to the European Commission, EU payments to Russia for energy in 2025 were 85% below 2021 levels. EU exports to Russia were down 66%, while EU imports from Russia had fallen 83% compared with 2021.
This represents a fundamental transformation of the European-Russian economic relationship.
Before the war, Russia was deeply embedded in Europe’s energy and industrial economy.
Today, Brussels is deliberately trying to make that relationship increasingly irrelevant.
The New European Strategy Is About Isolation, Not Just Sanctions
The EU’s objective is no longer simply to punish individual Russian companies or officials.
It is increasingly about restructuring Europe’s economic relationship with Russia.
That includes reducing Russian energy dependence, restricting access to advanced technology, targeting financial channels and disrupting the networks Russia uses to bypass sanctions.
The EU’s June measures, for example, specifically targeted Russia’s military-industrial complex, energy revenues and the shadow-fleet ecosystem used to transport Russian oil.
This creates a two-level economic war.
Ukraine is attacking physical infrastructure inside Russia.
Europe is attacking the external economic environment that allows Russia to keep financing and supplying the war.
Together, those strategies could become considerably more powerful than either one operating alone.
Why Russia Has Not Collapsed
Yet declaring victory would be premature.
Russia has adapted remarkably well to Western sanctions.
Moscow has redirected trade toward China, India, Turkey, Central Asia and other markets. It has increased domestic military production and developed alternative payment mechanisms.
Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union is also being used as one channel for alternative trade and potential sanctions evasion, according to recent analysis.
This is the central weakness of the economic-war strategy.
Isolation from Europe does not automatically mean isolation from the world.
As long as Russia can sell energy, obtain foreign currency, purchase critical goods through intermediaries and maintain trade with major non-Western economies, it can continue financing the war.
The objective therefore cannot simply be to “sanction Russia.”
The objective has to be to make sanctions increasingly difficult to evade.
Russia’s Economic Resilience Has a Price
There is another side to the Kremlin’s resilience.
Keeping the economy functioning under wartime conditions can require increasingly heavy state intervention.
Russia’s government is spending enormous amounts on defence while maintaining subsidies, industrial support and measures to stabilize the domestic economy.
Recent criticism from within Russia’s economic establishment is revealing.
Andrei Klepach, a senior economist at state development bank VEB, was dismissed after reportedly warning that Russia was losing the economic and technological race and facing serious consequences from prolonged war spending. His warnings included concerns about investment, industrial performance and social pressures.
Whether every prediction is correct is less important than what the episode reveals.
The Kremlin may still be able to finance the war, but doing so increasingly involves difficult economic trade-offs.
The Russian Budget Is Becoming a Strategic Pressure Point
War economies can survive for a surprisingly long time if governments are willing to sacrifice civilian consumption, investment and financial stability.
But eventually, the state has to choose where its resources go.
More military spending means fewer resources for infrastructure.
Higher defence production can crowd out civilian manufacturing.
High interest rates can discourage private investment.
Energy disruptions can increase domestic costs.
And declining foreign trade with Europe can reduce access to technology and capital.
This is why economic warfare rarely produces an instant collapse.
Instead, it can create structural decay.
A country may continue producing weapons while becoming poorer, less technologically competitive and more dependent on a smaller group of foreign partners.
That could be the more realistic objective of the Ukraine-EU strategy.
Can Ukraine’s Drone Campaign Change the Calculation?
Ukraine’s attacks on Russian economic infrastructure are especially important because they potentially create costs that sanctions cannot.
Sanctions affect financial flows and international trade.
Drone attacks can physically destroy infrastructure.
The combination can become much more damaging.
For example, if sanctions make it difficult for Russia to obtain replacement equipment while Ukrainian strikes repeatedly damage refineries or logistics hubs, Russia may face higher repair costs and longer recovery periods.
The same principle applies to warehouses and distribution centres.
The recent Ozon attacks show that Ukraine is attempting to widen the economic battlefield.
But there is a serious risk.
The more Ukraine attacks Russian economic infrastructure, the more Moscow may retaliate against Ukrainian economic targets.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has already warned that Ukraine’s attacks on Russian economic infrastructure could provoke strikes against Ukraine’s “most sensitive economic sectors.”
That means the new economic-war strategy could become a cycle of escalation.
The Biggest Weakness: China and Other Alternative Markets
If Europe wants to genuinely isolate Russia, the biggest challenge will not be Moscow.
It will be the global trading system outside the Western alliance.
Russia’s relationship with China is particularly important.
China provides Russia with a massive alternative market and access to manufactured goods and components that Moscow can no longer obtain easily from Europe.
India has also remained an important buyer of Russian oil.
Turkey and several Central Asian states have become important intermediaries in regional trade.
This means Russia is not economically alone.
It is increasingly reoriented rather than completely isolated.
That distinction could determine whether Europe’s strategy ultimately succeeds.
The New Economic War Could Work—But Slowly
The most realistic assessment is that the new economic-war strategy can hurt Russia, but it is unlikely to force an immediate surrender.
There are already measurable signs of pressure:
- Russian fuel shortages have appeared in multiple regions.
- Ukrainian strikes have disrupted refinery and logistics operations.
- Russian oil exports have faced infrastructure-related disruptions.
- EU energy trade with Russia has collapsed compared with pre-war levels.
- Russia’s sovereign wealth reserves have been significantly depleted.
- Access to Western technology and finance has become substantially harder.
- Moscow is increasingly dependent on alternative trading partners.
These pressures matter.
But Russia still possesses enormous territory, natural resources, industrial capacity and access to major non-Western economies.
That gives the Kremlin room to absorb economic shocks.
The Real Test Is 2027 and Beyond
The real test of the strategy may not be whether Russia experiences economic pain in 2026.
It clearly does.
The question is whether that pain becomes unsustainable over several years.
If Russia must continuously spend more money repairing refineries, rebuilding warehouses, importing fuel, replacing military equipment and subsidizing strategic industries while simultaneously losing access to European technology and capital, the economic burden could become increasingly difficult to manage.
At that point, the war becomes not merely a military contest but a test of economic endurance.
And Ukraine has an incentive to make that endurance increasingly expensive.
Could the Strategy Backfire?
There are also risks for Ukraine and Europe.
Ukraine’s attacks on Russian economic sites could trigger more destructive Russian retaliation.
European sanctions can also impose costs on European companies and consumers, particularly if energy markets become volatile.
Furthermore, excessive economic pressure can encourage Russia to deepen its dependence on China and develop alternative financial and trading networks.
There is therefore a strategic balancing act.
Europe wants Russia isolated—but not so isolated that Moscow becomes permanently integrated into a rival economic bloc led by Beijing.
Ukraine wants to weaken Russia’s war machine—but must avoid creating an uncontrollable escalation cycle.
The United States and Europe also need to ensure that sanctions remain enforceable rather than merely symbolic.
So, Will the New Economic-War Game Work Against Russia?
Yes—but probably not in the way a conventional military victory works.
The economic strategy is unlikely to suddenly collapse the Russian economy.
Instead, its potential power lies in gradually reducing Russia’s capacity to sustain a technologically sophisticated, high-intensity war.
Ukraine’s attacks are increasing the physical cost of maintaining Russia’s economic infrastructure.
European sanctions are increasing the financial and technological cost.
Together, they could create a long-term squeeze.
The critical question is whether Moscow’s adaptation mechanisms can continue developing faster than the West can close them.
Russia Can Survive Pressure—But Can It Sustain the War?
The latest attacks on Ozon and other Russian logistics networks mark an important evolution in Ukraine’s strategy.
The war is increasingly reaching into Russia’s commercial and economic infrastructure.
At the same time, the European Union is attempting to ensure that Russia cannot easily replace its lost European markets, technology and financial connections.
This is no longer simply a sanctions campaign.
It is becoming a broader economic containment strategy combined with physical disruption inside Russia.
Russia has survived the first phase of Western economic pressure.
But survival is not the same as strategic success.
If Ukrainian attacks continue disrupting energy and logistics infrastructure while European sanctions progressively close Russia’s access to finance, technology and high-value markets, Moscow may face a growing contradiction: it may retain enough economic strength to continue the war, but progressively less economic capacity to sustain it at its current scale.
That could ultimately become the real battlefield.
The question is no longer simply whether Russia’s economy will collapse.
It is whether Russia’s economic resilience can outlast Ukraine’s ability to increase the cost of war and Europe’s ability to tighten the global economic net around Moscow.
