In recent years, Russian authorities have ramped up their disinformation efforts, targeting Western media and organizations to legitimize their actions on the global stage. A prime example of this is a fabricated report falsely attributed to Reporters Without Borders (RSF) and the BBC, which claimed Ukrainian military members exhibited Nazi tendencies. This false narrative, spread through social media and pro-Kremlin influencers, is part of a broader disinformation strategy aimed at justifying President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine.
The Fabricated RSF Study and BBC Video
In August 2024, a video surfaced on social media, bearing the logo of the BBC and falsely claiming that RSF had conducted a study identifying 1,000 Ukrainian soldiers with Nazi sympathies. This video quickly gained traction, amassing over 400,000 views, especially on platforms like X (formerly Twitter) and Telegram. The study, however, was entirely fictitious, as both the BBC and RSF denied any involvement.
The video was particularly damaging as it featured the likeness of Antoine Bernard, RSF’s Director of Advocacy and Assistance, falsely implying his endorsement of the content. The creators of the video attempted to manipulate viewers into believing that the BBC and RSF had uncovered troubling truths about the Ukrainian military, a narrative that aligns with Russian attempts to paint Ukraine in a negative light.
Disinformation as a Tool for War
Russian disinformation campaigns are not new. They are a key component of a broader strategy aimed at shaping global opinion in favor of Russian foreign policy, especially concerning Ukraine. By using credible Western organizations like the BBC and RSF, Russian propagandists hope to lend legitimacy to their false claims. This tactic is known as “information laundering”—the act of disseminating false information through seemingly reputable sources to manipulate public opinion.
Arnaud Froger, the head of RSF’s Investigations Desk, likened this method to that of criminal organizations, stating, “They act like a criminal organization, applying methods used by traffickers to create value for illegal revenue within the information space: disinformation is produced, laundered, then re-injected into public discourse to be reused and perceived as credible information.”
Origins of the Disinformation: Social Media and Propaganda Amplifiers
The RSF investigation, conducted with the help of Bloom Social Analytics, traced the origins of the fabricated BBC video. On August 24, 2024, the video was first posted on X by a user named “Patricia,” who claimed to be a translator based in France. Patricia’s profile, however, bore all the hallmarks of a bot or troll account. It was created in February 2024, regularly posting content in English, German, French, and Russian—often supportive of Russia and highly critical of Ukraine.
The account’s profile picture was sourced from a Russian website offering avatars of blonde women, and its name appeared to be auto-generated. This level of sophistication indicates that the account was created explicitly to spread disinformation, as confirmed by Elon Musk’s AI tool, Grok. The tool highlighted that the account frequently posted pro-Russian content, reinforcing its role as a propagandist.
Following its initial posting, the video was picked up by Chay Bowes, an Irish entrepreneur with ties to Russian political circles. Bowes, known for his pro-Russian stance, amplified the video to a broader audience. In June 2023, he had even been invited to address the UN Security Council, where he accused NATO of waging a proxy war in Ukraine.
Further Amplification by Pro-Kremlin Influencers
The disinformation campaign gained further momentum when Simeon Boikov, known as the “Aussie Cossack,” shared the video with his 83,000 followers on Telegram. Boikov, who has a history of promoting Kremlin propaganda, has been granted Russian citizenship and operates from the safety of the Russian consulate in Sydney. His involvement further exemplifies how Russia leverages individuals with public profiles to spread disinformation.
Once the video reached Telegram, a platform with significant traffic in Russia, it began circulating widely among pro-Kremlin accounts. Maria Zakharova, the spokesperson for Russia’s Foreign Ministry, was one of the first officials to publicly endorse the video during a press conference on August 28, 2024. Following her lead, Russian embassies in countries like Chile and Bulgaria reposted the video, which was eventually uploaded to the Russian Foreign Ministry’s official website.
By the time the video had reached mainstream Russian media, its reach had grown exponentially. Ruslan Ostachko, a well-known presenter on Channel One and a member of “Team Putin,” reposted the video on his Telegram account, further amplifying its reach. By September 4, 2024, the video had been viewed over 156,000 times after being shared by prominent military blogger Sergei Kolyasnikov.
The Role of Social Media Platforms in Facilitating Disinformation
The rapid spread of this fabricated video raises questions about the role of social media platforms in curbing disinformation. Despite RSF’s efforts to alert X about the false video, the platform has been slow to act. RSF sent 12 alerts to X, requesting the removal of posts associated with the video. As of this writing, many of the posts remain live, with the platform citing the EU’s Digital Services Act as a reason for not removing one of the posts.
This slow response is troubling, especially given the platform’s significant role in amplifying the video. Telegram, often criticized for its lack of content moderation, also played a central role in disseminating the disinformation. The platform’s popularity in Russia makes it an ideal tool for spreading Kremlin-backed propaganda.
Fabrication and dissemination
The fabrication and dissemination of the false BBC video is a stark reminder of the dangers posed by modern disinformation campaigns. By using credible Western organizations to lend legitimacy to their false narratives, Russian propagandists are able to manipulate public opinion and further their political objectives. The failure of social media platforms to promptly remove this type of content underscores the challenges in combating disinformation.
As this case demonstrates, the Russian disinformation machine operates with remarkable efficiency, creating a complex web of falsehoods designed to support its geopolitical agenda. The fabricated RSF study is just one example of how Russia manipulates information to justify its actions in Ukraine. Combating these efforts requires a coordinated response from governments, media organizations, and social media platforms alike.
