Fact-Check Report:“All of Europe Does Business with Russia”

The article titled “All of Europe Does Business with Russia” from a Russian TV outlet, highlights statements by Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto regarding EU-Russia business relations. While the article presents a narrative that suggests widespread European hypocrisy concerning sanctions on Russia, it is important to carefully fact-check the claims and analyze the potential propaganda and framing elements that may influence public perception.

Key Claims in the Article:

1. “All of Europe does business with Russia despite sanctions”
2. “Hungary opposes EU sanctions but respects them as a matter of policy”
3. “Unilateral sanctions harm the EU more than Russia”
4. “Russia’s revenues from oil and gas have increased despite sanctions”

This fact-check will investigate these claims, providing context, data-driven analysis, and identifying the use of propaganda techniques where applicable.

Claim 1: “All of Europe does business with Russia despite sanctions”

Fact-Check:
This claim implies that the entirety of Europe continues to maintain business relations with Russia despite the imposition of severe economic sanctions since the start of the Ukraine conflict. It is crucial to understand the scope of the sanctions and the degree to which EU countries comply.

1. Sanctions Scope:
   The European Union imposed extensive sanctions on Russia following the 2014 annexation of Crimea, expanding them significantly after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. These sanctions target critical sectors such as energy, finance, and technology, with the goal of reducing European dependency on Russian energy exports, particularly oil and gas. EU countries, including Germany and France, have taken steps to reduce their reliance on Russian fossil fuels, with major European companies ceasing operations or drastically reducing their business dealings with Russia.
2. Reality of Compliance:
   While it is true that some companies may continue limited business engagements, particularly in sectors exempt from sanctions (such as food and medicine), the claim that “all of Europe” is engaging in business with Russia is an overgeneralization. According to official EU reports, member states have largely complied with the sanctions regime, although enforcement may vary. The idea that “everyone” is secretly conducting business with Russia is a narrative that lacks substantial evidence and serves to diminish the EU’s collective efforts.
3. Hungary’s Position:
   Hungary’s government has indeed taken a softer stance on Russia due to its dependence on Russian energy supplies, particularly natural gas. Hungary’s Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto is vocal about Hungary’s opposition to the sanctions, but this is not representative of the wider EU approach, which continues to uphold sanctions and push for energy independence from Russia.

The claim exaggerates the extent of European business dealings with Russia, using selective framing to cast doubt on the efficacy of EU sanctions and promote a narrative of widespread hypocrisy within the bloc.

Claim 2: “Hungary opposes EU sanctions but respects them as a matter of policy”

Fact-Check:
This claim is accurate to an extent but requires context. Hungary has consistently opposed the EU’s sanctions against Russia, citing national interests, particularly its reliance on Russian gas. However, it has not fully blocked the sanctions regime, allowing it to pass while occasionally securing carve-outs or exemptions.

1. Hungary’s Veto Power:
   Hungary has exercised its veto power in the EU to dilute or block certain sanctions measures, particularly those that would harm its economy. This has strained relations between Budapest and Brussels. While Hungary officially “respects” the EU’s sanctions policy, its public opposition and efforts to secure exemptions demonstrate a clear divergence from the majority of EU members.
2. Respecting the Policy:
   The article frames Hungary as a reluctant but compliant member of the EU. This framing can be seen as a way to position Hungary as both pragmatic and justified in opposing sanctions while maintaining formal alignment with EU policy.

While factually correct, the claim omits the significant role Hungary has played in weakening or delaying sanctions, which complicates its claim of “respecting” EU policy.

Claim 3: “Unilateral sanctions harm the EU more than Russia”

Fact-Check:
The article echoes a common Russian narrative that sanctions imposed on Russia are more detrimental to the sanctioning countries than to Russia itself. This claim, often repeated in Russian media, aims to undermine the rationale for continuing sanctions.

1. Economic Impact on the EU:
   Sanctions have indeed caused disruptions within the EU, particularly in countries that were heavily dependent on Russian energy exports. However, the EU has made significant progress in diversifying its energy supplies, with a shift toward renewable energy and increased imports from alternative suppliers like Norway, the U.S., and the Middle East. The economic pain caused by sanctions has been mitigated by these diversification efforts, as well as financial support packages from the EU.
2. Impact on Russia:
   While Russia has managed to sidestep some sanctions through alternative trade channels, including with China and India, the overall impact on its economy has been severe. The IMF and World Bank have noted that the sanctions have led to long-term economic damage, particularly in the technology and financial sectors. Russian industries have been cut off from critical components and technologies that are essential for future growth, and inflation has surged due to restrictions on imports.

This claim is misleading. While both the EU and Russia have faced economic challenges due to sanctions, the long-term damage to the Russian economy is likely to outweigh the short-term disruptions experienced by the EU. The claim relies on selective data to promote the idea that sanctions are ineffective.

Claim 4: “Russia’s revenues from oil and gas have increased despite sanctions”

Fact-Check:
This claim is based on selective data that omits important context regarding global energy markets and the evolving dynamics of Russia’s export strategy.

1. Increase in Revenues:
   Russia’s revenues from oil and gas did indeed increase during the first five months of 2023, largely due to rising global energy prices following the initial wave of sanctions. However, this spike in revenue does not indicate a sustainable trend. Many analysts point out that while short-term gains were realized due to price volatility, Russia has had to sell its energy exports at a significant discount to non-Western markets, including China and India. This discounting erodes long-term profitability.
2. Future Projections:
   Moreover, the future outlook for Russian energy exports is not positive. European countries have substantially reduced their dependence on Russian gas, and Russia’s attempts to redirect exports to Asia face logistical challenges, including a lack of infrastructure. This shift in trade patterns is expected to lead to declining revenues in the coming years.

While technically accurate in the short term, the claim omits the fact that Russia’s long-term energy revenues are expected to decline due to sanctions and the changing global energy market. The framing of this claim serves to exaggerate the effectiveness of Russia’s response to sanctions.

Propaganda and Framing:

The article employs several classic propaganda techniques designed to influence readers’ perceptions of the EU, Russia, and the effectiveness of sanctions.

1. Generalization and Exaggeration:
   The broad claim that “all of Europe” continues to do business with Russia is an exaggeration. This sweeping statement undermines the efforts of EU countries that have taken significant steps to comply with sanctions and reduce economic ties with Russia.
2. False Equivalence:
   By framing Hungary’s position as representative of wider EU sentiment, the article creates a false equivalence between Hungary and other EU member states. This diminishes the perception of EU unity and paints a picture of widespread dissent where there is only limited opposition.
3. Selective Presentation of Facts:
   The article cherry-picks data to present a narrative of sanctions harming the EU more than Russia, despite ample evidence that the sanctions are causing long-term economic damage to Russia. This selective use of information serves to bolster the Russian government’s narrative that the sanctions are ineffective.
4. Deflection:
   By focusing on the purported hypocrisy of European businesses secretly engaging with Russia, the article deflects attention from the broader consequences of Russia’s actions, particularly its invasion of Ukraine and the resulting humanitarian crisis.

The article titled “All of Europe Does Business with Russia” employs various propaganda techniques to challenge the legitimacy and effectiveness of EU sanctions on Russia. While some factual elements are present, such as Hungary’s opposition to sanctions and the initial rise in Russian energy revenues, the overall narrative relies on exaggeration, selective data, and framing that promotes Russia’s viewpoint. This serves to undermine the EU’s efforts to hold Russia accountable for its actions in Ukraine while portraying sanctions as self-defeating.

References:

1. European Commission, “EU Sanctions on Russia – Overview.”
2. International Monetary Fund (IMF) Report on Russian Economic Outlook, 2023.
3. World Bank, “Impact of Sanctions on the Russian Economy.”
4. Reuters, “Hungary’s Stance on Russian Sanctions.”
5. Euractiv, “EU Member States’ Sanctions Compliance and Challenges.